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A HOUSE BUILT ON SAND:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF ESPIONAGE ACT
PROSECUTIONS FOR LEAKING TO THE PRESS
Heidi Kitrosser & David Schulz*
INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11 our government has embarked on an
unprecedented surge in leak investigations and Espionage Act
prosecutions for the disclosure of classified information to the
American press—punishing disclosures about mass surveillance
of U.S. citizens, Russian interference in the U.S. election, FBI
targeting of Muslim groups, and other issues of legitimate public
concern. These prosecutions are designed to squelch the flow of
classified information to the public, and they do.
Despite obvious First Amendment issues posed by this
transformation of the 1917 Espionage Act into a twenty-first
century official secrets act, prosecutors and courts slough off
constitutional concerns. The Fourth Circuit’s 1988 ruling in
United States v. Morison1 was the first judicial opinion addressing
the constitutionality of a media leak prosecution under the
Espionage Act;2 it remains the only appellate court opinion on
the matter to this day. District courts since Morison have
routinely dismissed First Amendment objections to Espionage
Act prosecutions of those who leak to the press, embracing a
form of national security exceptionalism to free speech that
extends deep deference to executive branch judgments about the
needs of national security with virtually no consideration of the
First Amendment rights of leakers, the public or the press.3

* Heidi Kitrosser is the Robins Kaplan Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota Law School. David Schulz is a Floyd Abrams Clinical Lecturer in Law
and Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School. We both owe a debt of
gratitude to Patrick Kabat, with whom we have spent a great deal of time
brainstorming about the ideas in this paper. Patrick’s insights greatly benefitted this
project. We are also very grateful to the students, faculty, and staff of the First
Amendment Law Review for inviting this contribution to their annual symposium, to
the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School for
allowing us to preview a preliminary version of this paper at its 2020 Free Expression
Scholars Conference, and to the University of Kentucky Law School for hosting a
workshop on this paper in its Randall Park Speaker Series.
1
844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
2
Technically, of course, it was second insofar as it followed the district court opinion
in the same case. See United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985).
3
See infra Part III.B.
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The reasoning in these cases is deeply antithetical to basic
principles of free expression and First Amendment doctrine. It
also turns a blind eye to the reality of a monstrously bloated
classification system that too often conceals embarrassments,
mismanagement, and illegality. As the use of the Espionage Act
to prosecute leaks to the press rather than leaks to foreign
adversaries exploded in recent years, a number of scholars have
explored these concerns and suggested judicial and legislative
fixes to the First Amendment problems presented by this
transformation of the Espionage Act into an official secrets act.4
Until now, however, none have taken a close look at the
precedential edifice upon which rests today’s misguided
approach in media leaks cases. This edifice presents a puzzle,
after all. On the one hand, the reasoning of the media leaks cases
is deeply at odds with basic aspects of modern First Amendment
doctrine; on the other, courts can cite to a growing body of
precedent suggesting that constitutional challenges to Espionage
Act leak prosecutions have long been resolved in the
government’s favor.5
The answer to this puzzle, it turns out, stems largely from
the expansive nature and long history of the Espionage Act itself,
and from the evolution of the government’s use of the Act since
9/11. Hastily enacted during World War I, the Espionage Act
has been around for more than 100 years, and its broad language
can be read to cover everything from classic spying6 to the type
4

See, e,g, WHISTLEBLOWING NATION, THE HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY
DISCLOSURES AND THE CULT OF STATE SECRECY (Kaeten Mistry & Hannah Gurman
eds., 2020); Mailyn Fidler, First Amendment Sentence Mitigation: Beyond a Public
Accountability Defense for Whistleblowers, 11 HARV. NAT’L SEC. L. J. 214 (2020); Heidi
Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Developments and a Closer
Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1221 (2015)
[hereinafter Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment]; Yochai Benkler, A
Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 281, 283–84, 303–04 (2014); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor
Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449
(2014); Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First
Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 409 (2013) [hereinafter Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State];
Pamela Takefman, Note, Curbing Overzealous Prosecution of the Espionage Act: Thomas
Andrews Drake and the Case for Judicial Intervention at Sentencing, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
897 (2013); see also David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns
and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 516, 626
(2013).
5
See infra Part III.
6
By “classic spying,” we mean gathering information with the intent to secretly
convey it to an enemy of the United States. The key here is not only the adversarial

2021]

A HOUSE BUILT ON SAND

155

of national security news reporting that appears regularly in
publications like the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. It
was decades before the government thought to use the Act
against someone who leaked to the press rather than to prosecute
international spying.7 As a result, constitutional challenges to the
Espionage Act arose—and were rejected—over several decades
in prosecutions for traditional spying brought in the context of
an extremely limited national security classification system that
did not substantially expand until after World War II.8 The
earliest cases also addressed since-amended statutory provisions
featuring relatively high scienter requirements and were decided
before the Supreme Court erected the foundations of modern,
highly protective free speech doctrine.9
Once the government did begin to prosecute media
leakers, courts resolved constitutional challenges by dressing
their intuitions about national security exceptionalism in the
vestments of anachronistic Espionage Act precedent. This
approach has taken on a life of its own. Courts first confronting
constitutional challenges in media leak cases applied the early,
inapposite precedents; those decisions are cited in turn in
subsequent leak prosecutions, and on it goes, as a lengthening
line of authority appears to confirm the absence of any serious
First Amendment problems.
This perception is fundamentally incorrect. The
government’s use of the Espionage Act to prosecute those who
leak to reporters information of intense public interest rests on a
shaky constitutional foundation with which courts have yet to
grapple, and that cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
This article demonstrates how First Amendment concerns have
thus far been side-stepped by the courts and why they urgently
need to be addressed.
In Part I of this Article, we explain that the use of the
Espionage Act to prosecute media leaks is antithetical to free
speech values and to modern free speech doctrine. In failing
meaningfully to restrain such uses, courts have sanctioned a type

intent but the plan for secret conveyance, rather than communication to the media for
purposes of informing the public.
7
See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
8
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Part III.
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of national security exceptionalism that damages the public’s
ability to check their governors.
In Part II, we trace the Espionage Act’s evolution, from
its early decades as a tool used exclusively to prosecute spies and
traitors who leaked information to foreign governments, to its
current incarnation as something approaching an official secrets
act. This discussion underscores how very different the world
was in the early and mid-twentieth century when the key
precedents on which the Morison court and its progeny rely were
decided. Part II also highlights the role that technology has
played in smoothing the Act’s path to becoming the
government’s key weapon against unauthorized leaks. Modern
technology largely freed the government from its prior need to
subpoena journalists to identify and prosecute leakers and, in so
doing, removed a crucial element of “First Amendment friction”
from prosecutorial decisions to pursue Espionage Act leak
prosecutions.10
In Part III, we do a deep dive into the growing
precedential edifice of cases in which courts ever more
confidently assert that media leak prosecutions pose little if any
problem under the First Amendment. This confidence is sorely
misplaced. The foundational case––United States v. Morison––
justified its dismissal of the serious First Amendment interests at
stake by relying on an amalgam of anachronistic and inapposite
precedents. In building on Morison, and on other cases that rely
on Morison, courts continue to compound the error, placing more
and more weight on this ramshackle edifice.
Part IV provides a brief overview of the types of steps that
could address the First Amendment concerns presented by the
use of the Espionage Act to prosecute leaks to the media. In
recent years a number of these reforms have been addressed in
depth elsewhere.11 We review them here simply to provide a
sense of the constitutional and statutory fixes that courts and
legislatures should consider. To the extent that they have

10
11

See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part IV (discussing some of this work).
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sidestepped such review, they have been enabled by the shaky
precedential edifice that we examine in Part III.
I.

THE SUBSTANTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEMS
CREATED BY USING THE ESPIONAGE ACT AS AN
OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

When viewed through the lens of basic free speech theory
and doctrine, media leak prosecutions raise grave concerns that
call for searching judicial review. At the base of this position is
the understanding that classified information is, after all,
information; to convey it is to speak. Insofar as such
communications concern government, foreign affairs, or public
policy, they are in a realm that scholars and jurists routinely
place at the very core of the First Amendment.12 Suppressing
media leaks also raises a worry at the heart of much free speech
theory and doctrine: government actors may single out that
speech (i.e., those media leaks) that casts them in a bad light.13
Several aspects of free speech doctrine reflect a
commitment to protecting the vigorous exchange of information
and opinion on matters of public importance and a
corresponding fear that government actors will punish or deter
speech that criticizes them. For example, in the 1964 case of New
York Times v. Sullivan,14 the Supreme Court famously imposed a
very high bar on defamation lawsuits brought by public officials,
citing our “profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.”15 The Sullivan Court also referenced the “obsolete
doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors,”
and stressed that “the protection of the public requires not merely
discussion, but information.”16

12

See, e.g., HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY 59, 63 (2015) (citing an
“eclectic” sampling of works on free speech theory and noting that each work deems
speech about government “either central to the First Amendment’s purpose or
encompassed in a broader free speech value or set of values”).
13
See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 33–4,
44–6, 86, 162–63 (1982) (demonstrating that all major theories of free speech share a
core distrust of government).
14
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15
Id. at 270.
16
Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
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The Supreme Court similarly erected a high hurdle for
prosecutors to surmount when they attempt to punish speakers
for inciting violence. In the 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,17
the Court held that one cannot constitutionally be punished for
such speech unless it is intended to incite, and likely to incite,
imminent, lawless action.18 Brandenburg marked an important
shift from the Court’s approach in a series of World War I and
early Cold War cases involving prosecutions for antiwar,
communist, and socialist speech.19 In those earlier cases, the
Court had approached the government’s claims with a great deal
of credulity. There is wide consensus in retrospect that the Court
deferred unduly to the government in those cases, enabling it to
chill public debate on matters of national importance.20 In
Brandenburg, the Court appeared to have internalized these
critiques, shaping its doctrine to err on the side of public
discourse and against reflexively giving credence to government
claims of harm.
Courts also have evinced concerns over government
abuse outside of the context of “unprotected” speech categories.
Such fears are manifest, for example, in the general rule that
content-based restrictions on speech receive the most rigorous
level of judicial scrutiny.21 This rule marks an effort to stave off
any government attempts to “effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace.”22
Courts recognize as well the uniquely valuable role that
government employees can play through their speech, including
by exposing government misdeeds to which they alone have
access. To be sure, the Supreme Court gives government
employers considerable leeway to fire, demote, or otherwise
retaliate against employees for their speech.23 Nonetheless, the
17

394 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 447.
19
See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 227–36 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (discussing doctrinal evolution from a
series of World War I era cases through Brandenburg).
20
See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, 179–
207, 403–11 (2004); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First
Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1166–73
(1982).
21
See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 615, 624–25 (1991).
22
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (quoting Simon & Schuster v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
23
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236–41 (2014).
18
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Court has also made clear that government employees retain
some constitutional protection from employment repercussions
for their speech.24 The Court credits this protection partly to the
“special value” of public employees’ speech––a value rooted in
the fact that “those employees gain knowledge of matters of
public concern through their employment.”25
None of these doctrinal features nor their theoretical
foundations tell us precisely how courts ought to approach the
liability and sentencing questions that arise in media leak
prosecutions. They do, however, give us some important
baselines. Outside of the classified information context, we see
that courts ordinarily apply very high levels of scrutiny to claims
that the content of information is too dangerous to convey.26
Courts also recognize the heightened importance of speech on
matters of public concern, the special value of public employees’
speech, and the dangers that the government will exaggerate
national security threats and punish speech that casts it in a bad
light.
It is important to ask, then, whether there is something
about the national security classification system that justifies a
dramatic departure from these baselines when classified
information is at issue. From a theoretical perspective, the
answer is surely no. The notion that the executive branch––or
even the political branches acting in tandem––can erase or
substantially diminish the robust First Amendment protections
that would otherwise apply, simply by declaring swaths of
information “classified,” flies in the face of core free speech
principles. Such a system is antithetical to the fears of
government overreach and abuse that underlie much of modern
free speech doctrine.
The realities of the classification system bear out these
theoretical concerns. As we have elaborated elsewhere,27
information is massively over-classified in the United States, and
there is longstanding, bi-partisan consensus to this effect.28
24

Id.
Id. at 240.
26
See Williams, supra note 21, at 624–26.
27
See, e.g., Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State, supra note 4, at 426–29.
28
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Constitutional Law, First Amendment
Law, and Media Law in support of Defendant at 7–12, United States v. Albury, No.
18-cr-00067 (D. Minn. Oct. 4, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/jud/albury-amicus.pdf.
25
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Indeed, “every government study of the issue over the last six
decades has found widespread classification of information that
the government had no basis to conceal.”29 The problem was
summed up succinctly by former solicitor general Erwin
Griswold, who wrote that “It quickly becomes apparent to any
person who has considerable experience with classified material”
that “the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national
security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one
sort or another.”30
Endemic overclassification, in short, is a real-life
manifestation of the notion that the government will abuse its
powers to stifle debate about itself. It illustrates the wisdom of
the judiciary’s strong presumptions against government efforts to
curtail speech on matters of public importance and against
content-based restrictions on speech more broadly. It also betrays
the folly of classification exceptionalism––that is, of the notion
that these doctrinal protections should shrink away at the
wielding of a classification stamp.
The broad reach of the contemporary Espionage Act,
combined with rampant overclassification, endangers the ability
of the public to learn through the press information essential to
self-government. Compelling anecdotal evidence shows that
investigative reporters lost sources of classified and unclassified
information after the Obama administration launched its
unprecedented volley of media-leak prosecutions.31 Scott Shane,
a Pulitzer-winning journalist at The New York Times, observed in
2013 that “[m]ost people are deterred by those leak prosecutions.
They’re scared to death. There’s a gray zone between classified
and unclassified information, and most sources were in that gray
zone. Sources are now afraid to enter that gray zone. It’s having
a deterrent effect.”32 Washington Post reporter Rajiv
Chandrasekaran remarked that same year that “one of the most
pernicious effects [of the leak crackdown] is the chilling effect
29

Id. at 7 (citing multiple studies from 1956 through 2004, including reports
commissioned by the Defense Department and by Congress).
30
Erwin N. Griswold, Op-Ed., Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified
Information, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 1989),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/02/15/secrets-notworth-keeping/a115a154-4c6f-41fd-816a-112dd9908115/ (cited in Brief of Amici
Curiae Scholars of Constitutional Law, supra note 28, at 11).
31
LEONARD DOWNIE JR., THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE PRESS 2–3 (2013),
https://cpj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/us2013-english.pdf.
32
Id. at 2.
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created across government on matters that are less sensitive but
certainly in the public interest as a check on government and
elected officials.”33 Aggressive Espionage Act prosecutions send
a pointed message to career insiders who contemplate exposing
abuses or illegality, or sharing information that casts an
administration in a bad light.
Addressing the Espionage Act’s clear conflict with the
First Amendment is essential given the importance of public
access to the very information that is being cut off at the source.
The First Amendment concerns are acute when it comes to
protecting the flow of information relating to the national
defense, where “the absence of the governmental checks and
balances present in other areas of our national life” makes an
informed citizenry “the only effective restraint upon executive
policy and power.”34 As Justice Black famously observed in the
Pentagon Papers case, “[t]he guarding of military and diplomatic
secrets at the expense of informed representative government
provides no real security for our Republic.”35

II.

THE FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
ESPIONAGE ACT IN THE POST 9/11 WORLD

Adopted hastily as the U.S. entered World War I, the
Espionage Act sought to protect the country from spies and
traitors.36 Four decades passed between Congress’s passage of
the Act in 1917 and the first use of the Act to prosecute a leak to
the press rather than to a foreign government.37 Between that
1957 prosecution and the end of the George W. Bush
administration in 2009, the federal government prosecuted only
three more such “media leaks.”38 After that, things changed
dramatically. The Obama Administration prosecuted eight
33

Id. at 3.
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
35
Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
36
Sam Lebovic, From Censorship to Classification, The Evolution of the Espionage Act, in
WHISTLEBLOWING NATION, supra note 4, at 47–55.
37
See Ian MacDougall, The Leak Prosecution That Lost the Space Race, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/the-leakprosecution-that-lost-the-space-race/495659/.
38
Federal cases involving unauthorized disclosures to the news media, 1778 to the present,
REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/resources/leakinvestigations-chart (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
34
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leakers under the Espionage Act, twice as many as had all
previous administrations combined, and the Trump
Administration upped the pace still more.39 During President
Trump’s first year in office, his Justice Department reportedly
opened at least twenty-seven leak investigations,40 and by the
time he left office, the Trump administration in one term had
filed as many indictments for leaks to the press as the Obama
administration filed in two.41
There is no single, comprehensive explanation for the
recent, dramatic, and ongoing rise in media leak prosecutions.
One factor surely is technology, although the nature of
technology’s impact itself is debatable. Certainly, technology
makes the prospect of massive, even indiscriminate leaks more
plausible, and thus could partly explain the rise in prosecutions.
We do not think, however, that this aspect of technology has
much explanatory power. Indeed, most of the Obama and
Trump administration prosecutions did not involve large-scale
leaks.
Rather, we believe that technology has strengthened the
government’s hand and made leak prosecutions more likely for
another reason: The increasing ubiquity of electronic
surveillance tools––ranging from GPS devices to cell phone and
e-mail records to security cameras to bar-coded entry and exit
badges––eases the government’s burden in identifying leakers in
the first place. Matthew Miller, a spokesperson for Attorney
General Eric Holder during the Obama Administration,
explained that the administration found media leak cases “‘easier
to prosecute’ with ‘electronic evidence.’ . . . ‘Before, you needed
to have the leaker admit it, which doesn’t happen’ . . . or the
reporter to testify about it, which doesn’t happen.’”42 As Miller’s
statement suggests, technological developments do not simply
make it easier to find leakers; they remove a potential judicial
check by obviating the need, in many cases, for prosecutors to
subpoena reporters and to defend those subpoenas against First
Amendment objections in court.
39

See infra sources cited in notes 40–41.
See Jameel Jaffer, The Espionage Act and a Growing Threat to Press Freedom, THE NEW
YORKER (June 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/theespionage-act-and-a-growing-threat-to-press-freedom.
41
See All Incidents, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER,
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/?categories=7 (last visited Mar. 4,
2021).
42
DOWNIE JR., supra note 31, at 9, 14.
40
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There is also a more fundamental set of reasons for the
Espionage Act’s dramatic evolution. The development of a large
peacetime classification system after World War II made media
leak prosecutions more logistically possible and more culturally
fathomable, while each prosecution itself has helped to
normalize subsequent ones. Today’s vast secret-keeping
infrastructure was unimaginable to the 1917 Congress, or even
to the 1950 Congress that amended the Espionage Act. A nonmilitary classification system did not exist in 1917, and by 1950
it had existed only in wartime.43
Indeed, we needn’t speculate as to whether the 1917
Congress would have tolerated the prospect of the President
declaring swaths of information unspeakable to the media or
unprintable by it, subject to criminal penalties. That Congress
rejected such a proposal, despite its being offered on the eve of
the U.S.’s entry into World War I and limited explicitly to
wartime.44 And the 1950 Congress added express language to the
Espionage Act indicating that it was not to be construed to
restrain the press or diminish First Amendment rights.45 It was
only as the memories of 1917 and 1950 receded, and as a
permanent classification infrastructure took shape and grew, that
the notion of using the Espionage Act to prosecute media leaks
became palatable. And the slow drip of early prosecutions
themselves––from the first, shocking prosecution in 1957, to the
ill-fated prosecutions of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo in
1973, to the successful prosecution of Samuel Morison more
than a decade later––helped to clear the path for the steady
stream of prosecutions that began in the aftermath of 9/11.
The normalizing effects have been not just logistical and
cultural, but doctrinal as well. As we will see in Part III, the
federal government struck gold in its third media leak
prosecution. That action, against naval intelligence analyst
Samuel Morison for leaking satellite photographs to a periodical,
resulted in a 1988 opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.46 The Fourth Circuit upheld Morison’s
prosecution, suggesting that there was meager First Amendment
43

ARVIN S. QUIST, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION 9, 45, 50–51 (Vol. 1,
2002).
44
Lebovic, supra note 36, at 51–52.
45
Id. at 59.
46
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988).
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interest at stake.47 Although the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning was
deeply anachronistic––relying heavily on early and mid-century
precedents that entailed classic spying and that themselves drew
on the relatively lean First Amendment doctrine of the time––
and despite two separate concurrences warning that future cases
may raise more pressing First Amendment concerns,48 Morison
has become the doctrinal bedrock on which subsequent cases
have repeatedly anchored themselves.
Below, in Part II(A), we elaborate on the Espionage Act’s
dramatic evolution from a law that went unused against media
leakers throughout two World Wars and most of the Cold War,
to one that today is wielded like an official secrets act. We also
dig further into two of the key elements responsible for this
trajectory––the creation of a vast and permanent national
security secrecy system in the United States over the past
century, and the ratchet effects of media leak prosecutions
themselves. In Part II(B), we look more closely at how
technology shortens the government’s path to finding leakers.
Perhaps most importantly, technological advances make it less
likely that prosecutors will encounter, or even have to factor in
the potential for litigation over subpoenaing journalists to testify
about their sources.

A. From Unfathomable to the New Normal: The Espionage Act as
a Tool to Prosecute Media Leakers
1. Congressional Intent and Understanding that the
Espionage Act Only Punished Spies and Traitors Who
Communicate with Foreign Agents
The authoritative 1973 study of the Espionage Act by
Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt Jr. traces the Act’s history
through both the 65th Congress that enacted it in 1917 and the
81st Congress that amended it through the 1950 Internal Security
Act.49 Edgar and Schmidt looked with particular care to the
evolution of the principal restraints imposed by the Act on the
unauthorized disclosure of information, codified today at 18
47

Id. at 1060, 1068 (“[W]e do not perceive any First Amendment rights to be
implicated here.”).
48
Id. at 1084–85 (Wilkinson, J., concurring); id. at 1086 (Phillips, J., concurring).
49
Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 934 (1973).
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U.S.C. §§ 793(d) & (e) (hereinafter “Section 793”) and 798(b)
(hereinafter “Section 798"):
As adopted in 1917, Section 793 drew on language from
the Defense Secrets Act of 1911 that prohibited the willful
communication of “anything connected with the national
defense” to one “not entitled to receive it.”50 As amended in
1950, Section 793 today makes it a crime for anyone with either
authorized possession (subsection (d)) or unauthorized
possession (subsection (e)) of information “relating to the
national defense” to “willfully” communicate that information
to an unauthorized person or to fail to return it on demand, if the
possessor “has reason to believe” the information “could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation.”51 When the communicated items are tangible––
such as documents or photographs, rather than orally conveyed
information––the Act does not even require willfulness.52 The
Act also has never defined what constitutes “national defense”
information.
Added to the Espionage Act in 1950, Section 798 more
specifically makes it a crime to publish “classified” information
that either (a) reveals the cryptographic and communications
intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign country,
or (b) discloses classified information obtained from a foreign
50

Id. at 939. Under the Defense Secrets Act, the communicated information also
must have been obtained from a military location or “other place connected with the
national defense.” Id. at 969. Foreshadowing the sloppiness of the soon-to-follow
1917 Act, the 1911 Act “was alternatively so broad in its first prohibition . . . and so
vague in succeeding sections as to virtually defy analysis.” Id. The 1911 Act’s “sparse
legislative history” suggested that Congress had been focused only on the problem of
spying. Id. at 969–70. “Once in the statute books,” however, “the formless terms of
the 1911 Act were accorded a respect and a putative clarity in later legislative stages
out of all keeping with the casual process that spawned them.” Id. at 1005.
51
18 U.S.C. § 793(d), (e). The 1950 amendments split the restriction in Section 793
into to two provisions, (d) and (e), dealing separately with individuals having
authorized possession of information and those with no authorization; restated the
scope of the restriction to include “information relating to the national defense”
(which remains undefined); and, added a scienter requirement (“the possessor has
reason to believe [the information] could be used to the injury of the United States or
the advantage of any foreign nation . . . .”) See Edgar & Schmitt, supra note 49, at
998–1000.
52
18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) prohibit disclosure of national defense information with
“reason to believe” the information “could be used to the injury of the United States
or to the advantage of any foreign nation[,]” but they do not impose the “reason to
believe” requirement to the disclosure of documents or other tangible things. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 738 n. 9 (1971) (White, J.
concurring).
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government or military force through the “processes of
communication intelligence.”53 Unlike Section 793, Section 798
is a strict liability provision that is violated if a disclosure is
“prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States,” or
benefits a foreign government, regardless of whether the person
disclosing the information had reason to believe that the
disclosure would cause harm.54
In reviewing the legislative history of these provisions,
Edgar and Schmidt drew two conclusions of importance to their
application today. First, the disclosure penalties in Section 793
were but one aspect of the complicated bills before Congress, and
the legislators grappling with the bills simply “never understood”
these sections or realized that their literal terms might be applied
to criminalize speech essential to public debate or preliminary
activities undertaken to promote that debate.55 Second, “neither
the Congresses that wrote the laws nor the Executives who
enforced them behaved in a manner consistent with the belief
that the general espionage statutes forbid acts of publication or
conduct leading up to them, in the absence of additional and
rarely present bad motives.”56
a. The 1917 Act
The historic record makes clear that the 65th Congress
did not believe it had created any type of “official secrets act” that
would punish a disclosure regardless of to whom it was made
and whether it caused any harm to U.S. interests. Both the House
and the Senate in 1917 rejected a provision that the Wilson
administration drafted and for which it lobbied actively, which
would have authorized the President, in “a time of war,” to
promulgate regulations governing the collection, recording,
publishing, communication, or “attempt to elicit any . . .
information relating to the public defense or calculated to be, or
which might be, useful to the enemy.”57 This provision received

53

18 U.S.C. § 798(a).
Id.
55
Edgar & Schmitt, supra note 49, at 1032.
56
Id. at 1077.
57
Id. at 947; see also id. at 950–65 (chronicling developments relating to, and ultimate
rejection of the provision in the House and the Senate).
54
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considerable attention in the House, the Senate, and the press.58
From the congressional debates, one can discern a common
understanding among the provision’s opponents and proponents
alike that it would have authorized prosecutions for publishing
designated national defense information “without any sinister
purpose at all,” albeit “only in time of war.”59 Opponents, who
carried the day, insisted that the costs of punishing
communications made for innocent purposes, including those
made to or by the press to inform the public, outweighed the
countervailing interests.60
The 65th Congress also rejected a provision that would
have given content to the words “not entitled to receive it” in the
precursor to today’s Sections 793(d) and (e), which prohibit the
communication of certain “information relating to the national
defense” to persons not entitled to receive it.61 The provision
rejected by Congress would have empowered the President “to
designate any matter, thing, or information belonging to the
Government, or contained in the records or files of any of the
executive departments, or of other Government offices, as
information relating to the national defense, to which no person
[other than those duly authorized] shall be lawfully entitled.”62
Congress thus declined in 1917 to grant the President authority
to classify information to which the criminal provisions of the
Espionage Act would apply.63

58

Indeed, the Senate in the 64th Congress initially passed a version of the provision
before rejecting it in the 65th Congress. Id. at 950–65. The House in the 65th
Congress first rejected the provision and then accepted a substitute for it before
ultimately rejecting the substitute. Id. Furthermore, between the 64th and 65th
Congresses, the press began to devote much more attention (and opposition) to the
provision, which in turn prompted more deliberation in Congress. Id.
59
Id. at 953 (citing bill proponent Sen. Walsh and characterizing his understanding
as typical).
60
Id. at 954–58. Before opponents prevailed in striking the provision, Senator
Cummins had proposed to limit it. His remarks on that proposal reflect opponents’
emphasis on the need to protect speech by and to the United States press: “I assume
that the President can, in so far as his supervision goes, prevent the disclosure by the
several departments of information relating to the Army and the Navy; but suppose it
is disclosed to individuals or to the newspapers, then the President’s power ceases
and the individual who communicates or the individual who publishes cannot be
punished.” Id. at 957 n.63. See also id. at 959 (citing parallel points made in the
House).
61
Id. at 1006–09.
62
Id. at 1008.
63
Id. at 1001.
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As Edgar & Schmitt note, this history calls into question
whether “the term [‘not entitled to receive it’] can be given
meaning by reference to Executive Orders.”64 Nonetheless, as
discussed below, courts more recently have given the term
meaning in precisely this way.65 The propriety of recent judicial
constructions aside, the point remains that members of the 65th
Congress expressly declined to grant such a designation power
in the Espionage Act, and presumably believed that the president
possessed no such power inherently.66
b. The 1950 Act
Congress amended the Espionage Act through the 1950
Internal Security Act.67 This amendment came at the height of
the McCarthy era, and much of the 81st Congress’s attention was
focused on higher profile parts of the Act, including provisions
“that made it unlawful to conspire to establish a totalitarian
dictatorship in the United States, the broad registration
requirements, and the powers of the Subversive Activities
Control Board.”68 With respect to the provisions that today are
invoked against leaks to the press, the 1950 legislative changes
were relatively small, although Congress did divide what was
previously one Section (d) into today’s Sections 793(d) and (e).69
Whether due to inattention, confusion, or some
combination of both, the 81st Congress’s approach to (d) and (e)
largely paralleled that of its predecessors.70 In passing the
Internal Security Act, Congress left intact language that could be
64

Id.
See infra Part III.A.3.
66
Edgar & Schmitt, supra note 49, at 1019. Indeed, Edgar & Schmitt observe that this
history raises “serious issues of whether . . . 793(d) and (e) are[] enforceable criminal
laws.” Id.
67
Id. at 1021–22.
68
Id. at 1028. As Edgar & Schmitt put it, “[s]ubsections 793(d) and (e) were tucked
away among the many provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950, a massive
effort to deal with what was then perceived to be the serious threat of domestic
communism.” Id. at 1022.
69
Id. at 1021. Section (d) currently focuses on persons with authorized access to
information, whereas section (e) targets those who obtain information without
authorization. Id. “The purpose of the distinction was to oblige the ordinary citizen
to return defense information” without official demand. Id. Congress also added
“information” to the list of covered items, along with a new textual culpability
requirement for conveying information as opposed to tangible items, such as
documents. Id. Congress also added violations for “causing or attempting to cause”
violations of (d) or (e). Id.
70
Id. at 1031.
65
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construed to empower the executive to criminalize the
communication of designated information to the press or the
public.71 Yet, just as in 1917, the legislative history from 1950
indicates that Congress did not intend or expect any such result.72
For example, when Senator Kilgore expressed worry that the bill
could “theoretically . . . make practically every newspaper in the
United States . . . into criminals without their doing any wrongful
act,” Senator McCarren, the bill’s sponsor, replied that the
suggestion “naturally concerns me greatly.”73 McCarren
solicited letters on the matter from Attorney General Clark, from
the Library of Congress, and from “eminent private lawyer”
Elisha Hanson.74 Both Clark and the Library of Congress
responded with letters that McCarren entered into the
congressional record.75 The letters were reassuring in their tone,
even as their literal language did not explicitly rule out the
possibility raised by Kilgore.76 Clark wrote, for instance, that the
Act’s “language [and] history,” and “the integrity of the three
branches of the Government . . . would indicate that nobody
other than a spy, saboteur, or other person who would weaken
the internal security of the Nation need have any fear of
prosecution.”77
Rather than offering an opinion on the existing language,
Hanson suggested reinserting a provision that had been dropped
in the drafting process that would make clear that the Act did not
erode First Amendment rights.78 His proposal was acted upon,
and a section of the final bill provided that the Act shall not “be
construed” to establish “military or civilian censorship or in any
way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech
as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.”79 There
was little further discussion of this press-protecting provision
once it was added back into the bill, and most of the
congressional debate about the First Amendment involved other

71

Id.
As Edgar & Schmitt put it, “The 1950 legislation thus follows the frustrating
pattern of so many of the espionage statutes: Congress said it, but seems not to have
meant it.” Id.
73
Id. at 1025.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1025–27.
76
Id. at 1025–26.
77
Id. at 1026.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1026–27.
72

170

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

parts of the Act.80 Nonetheless, Senator McCarren “plainly
viewed the anti-censorship proviso as a corrective for what he
saw as erroneous readings of 793(d) and (e).”81 More so, as Edgar
& Schmitt suggest, “the very fact that nothing further was said
about the threat that 793(d) and (e) might pose to a free press
may reflect belief that the proviso eliminated such a danger.”82
c. The Context in which the Act(s) were Written and Debated
We can better grasp the perspectives of the 65th and 81st
Congresses if we understand how very foreign today’s
classification regime would have seemed to them. The first
Executive Order on classification was not issued until 1940,
shortly after World War II began in Europe.83 Before 1940,
national security secrecy was dealt with predominantly through
regulations internal to the military.84 And it was not until 1951
that a peacetime classification system was initiated, via President
Harry Truman’s Executive Order 10290.85 Truman’s order was
decried by the press, members of Congress, and others who
considered it “unwarranted peacetime censorship.”86 Truman’s
successor, President Eisenhower, responded to the outcry by
vowing to scale the system back.87
In the long run, of course, the classification regime
prevailed. Today’s system towers over the one that struck
Americans as frighteningly radical in the 1950s. According to the
last reported figures, roughly 1,700 individuals have “Original
Classification Authorities”88 and more than 4 million people

80

Id. at 1028.
Id.
82
Id.
83
QUIST, supra note 43, at 9; Lebovic, supra note 36, at 54.
84
See QUIST, supra note 43, at 9, 45.
85
Id. at 50–51.
86
Luther A. Huston, Brownell Praises Information Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1953, at
20; see also, U.S. Adds Controls on Security Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1951, at 17;
QUIST, supra note 43, at 50–51.
87
Huston, supra note 86.
88
See INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT Office, 2018 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 4 (2018),
https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/images/2018-isoo-annual-report.pdf.
81
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possess derivative classification authority.89 In 2017 alone,
roughly 49 million new classifications were made.90
The evolution of the classification system is symptomatic
of, and perhaps a driver of, a fundamental shift in American
views of secrecy and free speech. As historian Samuel Lebovic
has chronicled in several recent publications, the paths of
freedom of speech and national security secrecy have gone in
largely opposite directions.91 As the government, including the
judiciary, has embraced the freedom to express one’s opinion, it
has also sanctioned an ever-growing system of national security
secrecy.92 During the Civil War, for example, “military
information was kept secret by regulating the sphere of
circulation, not controlling information at the source.”93 In some
cases, “hostile editors were jailed, select periodicals were barred
from the mail, and others were forcibly closed by the military.”94
Such methods became increasingly unacceptable in the twentieth
century, as epitomized by the emergence of a modern free speech
doctrine that is highly skeptical of official restrictions on the
content of what can be spoken or published. At the same time,
Americans have come to expect, and to accept, that government
will go to great lengths to bottle up information at the source.95
Today, this tension is epitomized by the growing body of
89

FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS
4 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/features/20180827security-clearance-determinations.pdf.
90
INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2017 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1, 42–43, 45
(2017) (reporting that 58,501 “original” classification decisions and 49 million
“derivative” classification decisions were made in 2017),
https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/reports/2017-annual-report.pdf. In its annual
reports during the Trump administration, ISOO broke with past practice and did not
list the number of classification decisions made in those years. See INFO. SEC.
OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2018, supra note 88; INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2019
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2019),
https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/reports/2019-isoo-annual-report.pdf.
91
See, e.g., SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF PRESS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2016); see also Lebovic, supra note 36, at 47.
92
See, e.g., Lebovic, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS, supra note 91.
93
Lebovic, supra note 36, at 47.
94
Id. at 47; see also, e.g., Timothy L. Ericson, Building Our Own “Iron Curtain”: The
Emergence of Secrecy in American Government, 68 THE AM. ARCHIVIST 18, 29 (2005)
(“During the Civil War, the federal government still had not developed a formal
system of protecting sensitive information. Significant controls occurred primarily in
the war zones and these were directed primarily at the press.”).
95
See, e.g., Lebovic, supra note 36, at 54 (“As this ever broadening distinction between
freedom of press and freedom of information was hollowing out the First
Amendment, it was simultaneously doing important work to legitimate the emerging
regime of state secrecy.”).
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precedent that treats Espionage Act prosecutions based on press
leaks as exceptions to a generally robust system of speech and
press freedoms.
d. Further Evidence of Congressional Understanding of the
Limited Scope of the Espionage Act
Congressional and executive actions and proposals in the
wake of both the 1917 and 1950 acts provide further evidence
that the Espionage Act was not understood to create a vehicle to
broadly pursue press leakers. In the years between the two Acts,
Congress passed three statutes “prohibiting publication of
discrete categories of highly sensitive information, without
regard to anti-American or pro-foreign intent,” and “[n]o one
ever suggested” that the Espionage Act already covered the
matter.96 Moreover, legislation repeatedly has been proposed
since 1950 “that can only reflect the assumption that the
espionage statutes do not prohibit non-culpable disclosure of
properly classified information.”97 As late as 2000, Congress
passed legislation that would have criminalized the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information, incorporating
a type of “official secrets act” as part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.98 President Clinton
vetoed that Act, specifically out of concern with its impact on
“the free flow of information [that] is essential to a democratic
society.”99

96

Edgar & Schmitt, supra note 49, at 1020.
Id. at 1055.
98
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, H.R. 4392, 106th Cong. § 303
(2000). The legislation imposed criminal penalties on anyone who ''knowingly and
willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified information acquired as a
result of such person's authorized access to classified information to a person who is
not authorized to access such classified information, knowing that the person is not
authorized to access such classified information.'' Id. This legislation did what the
Espionage Act does not—it removed the government’s obligation to show either that
a disclosure was actually “prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or
for the benefit of any foreign government,” 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2018), or was made
with “reason to believe” it could be used to injure the United States or advantage a
foreign government, id. § 793(d), (e) (2018). It criminalized the act of willfully
leaking classified information to anyone not authorized to receive it, regardless of
intent or impact. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 303.
99
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE, STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON
THE VETO OF HR 4392 (2000), https://fas.org/irp/news/2000/11/irp-001104leak.htm.
97
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Over time, of course, the executive branch increasingly
has proceeded as though the 1917 Espionage Act gives it all the
authority that it needs to prosecute any media leaks of classified
information. Just two years after President Clinton’s veto
message, George W. Bush’s first Attorney General, John
Ashcroft, told Congress that new legislation was not essential, as
“current statutes provide a legal basis to prosecute those who
engage in unauthorized disclosures, if they can be identified.”100
Ashcroft added that the Justice Department “would, of course,
be prepared to work with Congress” if it was to pursue new
legislation,101 but his priority was to use existing authorities more
aggressively. Ashcroft also took the position that the President
already had the constitutional power to classify and withhold
information “quite apart from any explicit congressional
grant.”102 He committed to rigorously investigate “unauthorized
disclosures of classified information[,] to identify the individuals
who commit them,” and to oversee vigorous “enforcement of the
applicable administrative, civil, and criminal provisions already
available.”103
2. Opening a Path to Prosecuting Leaks to the Press
Under the Espionage Act
Given this history, it is unsurprising that the executive did
not deploy the Espionage Act against a press leak during the
Act’s first forty years.104 To the contrary, it is jarring that the
government did pursue such a prosecution in 1957, just a few
years after Americans were introduced to the controversial
peacetime classification system. The 1957 prosecution was a
100

JOHN ASHCROFT, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., LETTER TO HOUSE SPEAKER J.
DENNIS HASTERT 3 (2002), https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dojleaks.pdf. In the
aftermath of the Clinton veto, Congress had passed legislation calling for a
“comprehensive review” of protections of classified information. Id. at 1. The Bush
administration conducted that review, and Ashcroft’s message followed. Id. at 2.
101
Id. at 9.
102
Id. at 2.
103
Id. at 3.
104
During World War II, government officials considered prosecuting the Chicago
Tribune for publishing a story revealing that the United States had cracked Japanese
codes before the Battle of Midway. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 258 (2008).
The Justice Department ultimately decided not to pursue the prosecution out of fear
that it would draw Japanese attention to intelligence capabilities. See id.; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Roy R. Ray Lecture Freedom of the Press in Time of War, 59 SMU L. REV. 1663,
1668 (2006).
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court martial proceeding against Army Colonel Jack Nickerson,
who had revealed the results of an Army missile program to the
press in an effort to demonstrate that Defense Secretary Charlie
Wilson had acted improperly in rejecting the Army missile in
favor of an inferior Air Force missile manufactured by GM,
Wilson’s former employer.105
The Nickerson prosecution marked a crossroad in the
Espionage Act’s evolution. The decision to commence the court
martial reflected both a growing concern in the executive branch
that its nascent classification system was leaky and a traditional
sensitivity to politically damaging or embarrassing leaks.106 But
the Nickerson experience gave prosecutors reason to hesitate
before bringing another press leak case under the Espionage Act.
The case garnered enormous public attention, and much of the
press coverage portrayed Nickerson as a martyr.107 The
prosecution also brought home the reality that revelations in
judicial proceedings and in the press could reveal further
information and prolong public attention to the classified
matters.108
In the end, the government dropped the Espionage Act
charge.109 Nickerson pled guilty to violating several Army
security regulations and lost his security clearance for a year.110
For the government, the public relations damage was
compounded later in the year when the Navy missile program
came in late and “far over budget,” and “its first attempted
satellite launch failed spectacularly––and on national television
no less––exploding on the launch pad.”111 When the Army
program was subsequently revived and proved successful,
“[p]laudits for Nickerson poured in,” with newspapers
“prais[ing] his foresight.”112
105

See MacDougall, supra note 37.
Id. (“It didn’t help, of course, that Nickerson had directly challenged and attacked
Wilson. Moreover, according to an FBI file, Wilson’s boss, Eisenhower, was
‘personally interested’ in the leak . . . .”).
107
See id.; Sam Lebovic, The Forgotten 1957 Trial That Explains Our Country’s Bizarre
Whistleblower Laws, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/the-forgotten-1957-trial-thatexplains-our-countrys-bizarre-whistleblower-laws-213771.
108
See MacDougall, supra note 37; Lebovic, supra note 107.
109
See MacDougall, supra note 37.
110
See id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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Once burned, twice shy. The government did not pursue
another leak prosecution under the Espionage Act until 1973,
when the Nixon Administration prosecuted Daniel Ellsberg and
Anthony Russo for leaking the Pentagon Papers.113 That
experience was nothing short of a disaster for the government.
The case ended in a mistrial called because of the
administration’s dirty tricks––including breaking into the office
of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist and attempting to bribe the
presiding judge with the prospect of the FBI directorship.114
Though castigated in some quarters, Ellsberg was hailed as a
hero in others.115
In 1985, Samuel Morison became the first person
convicted under the Espionage Act for leaking classified
information to the press.116 Morison had leaked photographs of
a Soviet air carrier––photographs to which he had access through
his employment with the U.S. Naval Intelligence Support
Center––to a British periodical called Jane’s Fighting Ships.117 In
his defense, Morison argued that he had sought to call attention
to the magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the
need for increased defense spending.118 The government
countered this point with evidence that Morison’s true motive
was to receive an offer of employment from the magazine.119 The
Fourth Circuit found neither the presence nor the absence of a
public interest motivation––nor, for that matter, of an objective
public interest in the information––relevant to the specific legal
questions at issue.120 Judge Russell’s opinion for the court treated

113

Ellsberg Case: Defendants Freed, Government Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1973, at
191.
114
Id.
115
See, e.g., Gabriel Schoenfeld, Rethinking the Pentagon Papers, NAT’L AFFAIRS
(Summer 2010), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/rethinkingthe-pentagon-papers (describing “two opposing narratives” about Daniel Ellsberg,
one as a “disloyal official” and one as a “lone hero.”).
116
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988).
117
Id. at 1060–63.
118
Id. at 1062.
119
Id. at 1084–85 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). See also Philip Weiss, The Quiet Coup:
U.S. v. Morison - A Victory for Secret Government, HARPER’S MAG., Sep. 1989, at 59–60.
120
As Judge Wilkinson reasoned in his concurrence, courts are not competent to
balance national security against the public interest in information: “The question,
however, is not one of motives as much as who, finally, must decide. The answer has
to be the Congress and those accountable to the Chief Executive.” Morison, 844 F.2d
at 1083 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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Morison’s actions as a simple theft that implicated no First
Amendment rights.121
Still, two of the three judges on the Morison panel––
including Judge Wilkinson, who joined Judge Russell’s opinion–
–wrote separately to emphasize that “the [F]irst [A]mendment
issues raised by [the defendant] are real and substantial and
require . . . serious attention . . . .”122 Judge Wilkinson discussed
at length the First Amendment interests at stake in press-source
prosecutions, observing that “[t]he First Amendment interest in
informed popular debate does not simply vanish at the
invocation of the words ‘national security.’ National security is
public security, not government security from informed
criticism.”123 But he also expressed doubt about judges’ abilities
to assess the need for secrecy in a given case and concern that
“disgruntled employee[s]” could threaten government programs
by exposing sensitive information.124 Wilkinson ultimately took
solace in the thought that sources for information about
“corruption, scandal, and incompetence in the defense
establishment,” were unlikely to be charged or convicted, and if
they were, First Amendment infirmities could be “cured through
case-by-case [judicial] analysis of the fact situations.”125 Judge
Phillips agreed that press-source prosecutions presented “real
and substantial” First Amendment issues, but shared Judge
Wilkinson’s expectation that leaks exposing important news
would not be punished.126 This expectation, he said, was “the
critical judicial determination forced by the [F]irst [A]mendment
arguments advanced in this case.”127
The Justice Department faced criticism over the potential
chilling effect of Morison’s prosecution on would-be
whistleblowers with information of vital public importance.128
Noting these concerns, President Clinton pardoned Morison

121

Id. At 1068–70 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1085 (Philips, J., concurring); id. at 1080–81 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
124
Id. at 1083.
125
Id. at 1083–84 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
126
Id. at 1085-86 (Phillips, J., concurring).
127
Id. at 1086.
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See Ben A. Franklin, Morison Receives 2-Year Jail Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1985,
at A21 (noting criticism of the prosecution as a threat to freedom of the press).
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shortly before leaving office in 2001.129 But the cat was out of the
bag. The Morison prosecution did not involve a classic press leak
of newsworthy information, given Morison’s personal profit
motive, but the fact that neither the jury nor the courts were
persuaded by his plea to consider the public interest in disclosure
laid the foundation for future Espionage Act leak prosecutions.
The effort to build on the shoulders of Morison started
during the George W. Bush administration, after 9/11
dramatically increased concerns over terrorism and heightened
sensitivity to protecting national security secrets. In 2005, a
Defense Department analyst, Lawrence Franklin, was indicted
and ultimately pleaded guilty to violating the Espionage Act by
orally disclosing classified information about American forces in
Iraq to an Israeli diplomat and two employees of the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”).130 In a move that
sent tremors through the media, the Bush administration then
brought charges under the Espionage Act against the AIPAC
lobbyists as well, under a reading of the Espionage Act that many
journalists feared could criminalize a great deal of national
security reporting.131 The lobbyists’ allegedly wrongful activities
involved the dissemination of information they had received
from a government employee while knowing the employee was
not authorized to disclose it.132 As the Washington Post objected
at the time, this theory of wrongdoing was effectively
“criminaliz[ing] the exchange of information,”133 and raised the
specter of criminal prosecutions of reporters who ask about
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Valerie Strauss, Navy Analyst Morison Receives a Pardon, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2001, at A17. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan supported Morison’s pardon,
writing to Clinton that if similar actions were taken on a widespread basis “it would
significantly hamper the ability of the press to function.” Letter from Sen. Daniel
Patrick Moynihan to President Clinton (Sep. 29, 1998),
https://fas.org/sgp/news/2001/04/moynihan.html.
130
See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (E.D. Va. 2006); William E.
Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for Newsgathering Crimes, 36 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 129, 168 (2009).
131
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 607–08 (noting that the lobbyists, Rosen and Weissman
were charged with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 793 (g); Rosen was also charged
violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)); see Jerry Markon, U.S. Drops Case Against Ex-Lobbyists,
WASH. POST, May 2, 2009, at A1.
132
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
133
Editorial, Time to Drop the Prosecution of AIPAC’s Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman,
WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2009 (urging Attorney General to drop charges),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/10/AR2009031003026.html.
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matters they know a government informant is not supposed to
discuss—something that happens every day in Washington.134
Although the Obama administration eventually dropped
the charges against the lobbyists in 2009,135 this hardly signaled
reticence to target government employees for suspected press
leaks. Indeed, the Obama administration would go on to
prosecute eight government employees under Section 793 of the
Espionage Act for leaking information to the media or for
retaining information in connection with suspected media
leaks.136
Were there any doubts that the floodgates had been
opened, they were erased by the actions of the Trump
Administration. In the administration’s first year, then Attorney
General Jeff Sessions boasted that the Justice Department was
investigating nine times as many leaks as the Obama
administration had investigated annually.137 During just one
term in office, the Trump administration indicted eight media
leakers—doubling the pace of leak prosecutions under the
Obama administration.138
The relevant Espionage Act provisions have, in short,
traveled far beyond the bounds that their drafters envisioned.
Essential to their journey was the creation of a sprawling,
permanent classification system by the mid-twentieth century.
That system gave content to features of the Act that might
otherwise have lacked meaning, including the “not entitled to
receive it” language. More fundamentally, the system has inured
Americans to the idea that there are vast swaths of information
that they are not allowed to see or to hear. These developments,
coupled with the normalizing effect that each prosecution has

134

See Lee, supra note 130, at 132-34.
See Charlie Savage, Assange Indicted Under the Espionage Act, Raising First
Amendment Issues, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/assange-indictment.html
(discussing the context surrounding the Obama Administration’s decision to drop the
case).
136
See Gabe Rottman, A Typology of Federal News Media “Leak” Cases, 93 TUL. L. REV.
1147, 1182–85 tbl. 1 (2019) (counting only the prosecutions brought under Section
793)).
137
See Brian Stelter, Jeff Sessions: We’re Investigating 27 Leaks of Classified Information,
CNN (Nov. 14, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/14/media/leakinvestigations-jeff-sessions/index.html.
138
See All Incidents, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER,
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/?categories=7.
135
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upon the next, provides a partial explanation for the current state
of affairs.
Technology, too, has contributed to the Espionage Act’s
transformation. At minimum, technology makes it easier for the
government to find leakers without having to subpoena
journalists. This prosecutorial advantage entails much more than
expedition. Rather, it removes an important point of friction, one
at which the judiciary––or even the executive branch––
traditionally paused to consider the First Amendment interests
at stake. We explore this change in Subpart B.
B. The Loss of “First Amendment Friction” as a Limitation on
Espionage Act Prosecutions for Leaking Information of
Legitimate Public Concern
1. The Friction Traditionally Provided by
The Prospect of Subpoenaing Reporters
Attorney General Ashcroft’s view that the Espionage Act
sufficiently protects classified secrets from leakers, “if they can
be identified”139 is telling and suggests an important factor that
has played into the vast expansion of Espionage Act
prosecutions of leakers in recent years. Well into the twentieth
century, a federal prosecutor contemplating an Espionage Act
prosecution based upon a leak to the press confronted the reality
that identifying the source of a leak was likely to require evidence
from the reporter who received the leaked information. This
reality necessarily pulled public interest and First Amendment
concerns into the prosecutor’s calculus about whether to
proceed, because a qualified reporter’s privilege had become
widely recognized in federal courts, even as the Morison case was
making its way to the Fourth Circuit.140 Prosecutors needed, in
short, to contemplate the possibility of compelling evidence from
reporters. This reality built a kind of “First Amendment friction”
into the use of the Act against leakers.
139

ASHCROFT LETTER TO HASTERT, supra note 100, at 3 (emphasis added).
Every federal circuit except the Sixth and Seventh has recognized some form of a
qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. See LEE LEVINE ET AL., 2
NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW (5th ed. 2018) at 20.01. Forty-nine states also
recognize some form of reporters’ privilege. See Id. at 19-4, n.14 (noting that 41 states
have statutory shield laws); id. at 20–12 (noting that 35 states judicially recognize a
reporters’ privilege in certain contexts).
140
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The Supreme Court has addressed the reporter’s privilege
on only one occasion, in the midst of upheavals from the
Vietnam War, the Black Panther movement, and social unrest.
In Branzburg v. Hayes141 the Court in 1972 refused to permit
reporters to assert a privilege against appearing before a criminal
grand jury to testify about a confidential source.142 But in
rejecting the reporters’ claim of privilege not to respond to a
subpoena at all, the Court acknowledged the significant First
Amendment implications presented—and five justices seemed to
accept the notion that a qualified public interest privilege should
be recognized in some contexts.143
Justice Powell, who provided the crucial fifth vote,
penned a separate concurrence that proved highly influential in
the lower courts. Powell underscored that “[t]he Court does not
hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury,
are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of
news or in safeguarding their sources.”144 Although the majority
rejected a blanket privilege against appearing before a grand jury,
Justice Powell expressly endorsed the continuing ability of
reporters to challenge specific subpoenas if they were not issued
in a good faith investigation or sought testimony about a
confidential source “without a legitimate need of law
enforcement.”145 In such cases, Justice Powell explained, a
reporter could continue to assert a privilege and would have
“access to the court on a motion to quash” where “[t]he asserted
claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of
a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct.”146 This directive to balance “constitutional and
societal interests” would impose a substantial impediment to the
141

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 706–08.
143
Id at 707–08; id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The Court does not hold that
newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights
with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources.”); id. at 712
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is my view that there is no ‘compelling need’ that can be
shown which qualifies the reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying before a
grand jury, unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime.”); id. at 725–26
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The reporter's constitutional right to a confidential
relationship with his source stems from the broad societal interest in a full and free
flow of information to the public.”).
144
Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
145
Id. at 709–10.
146
Id. at 710.
142
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pursuit of leakers so long as the testimony of a reporter was
critical to a successful prosecution.147
Possibly an even more influential source of First
Amendment friction was the set of guidelines that the
Department of Justice was in the process of adopting while
Branzburg was before the Court.148 These restrictions precluded
federal prosecutors from issuing a subpoena to a reporter in a
criminal case unless the U.S. attorney seeking the information
first demonstrated to the Attorney General personally that (1) the
information was essential to a successful investigation or
prosecution, (2) all reasonable attempts had been made without
success to obtain the information from other sources, and (3)
negotiations with the reporter had been pursued without
success.149 They had the effect of severely limiting the number of
subpoenas issued to reporters for several decades.150
The guidelines were first proposed by Attorney General
John Mitchell in 1970.151 They reflected a widespread
recognition, in the wake of government deception during the
Vietnam War, that reporters must be able to communicate in
confidence with sources. Indeed, the guidelines’ preamble
expressly recognized “a reporter’s responsibility to cover as
147

Over the subsequent decades, “overwhelming numbers of state and federal courts
have interpreted Branzburg . . . as recognizing in the First Amendment a qualified
journalist’s privilege of some dimension.” LEVINE, supra note 140 at 18–41
(discussing cases). The existence and scope of the reporter’s privilege, however,
continues to be litigated. In the most recent reporter’s privilege case to reach an
appellate court, the Fourth Circuit rejected the existence of any privilege—First
Amendment or common law, absolute or qualified—that protects a reporter from
being compelled to testify in a criminal proceeding about criminal conduct the
reporter observed or participated in. United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492 (4th
Cir. 2013).
148
See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2019).
149
Id. These guidelines were revised in 2014 and again in 2015 by Attorney General
Eric Holder during the Obama administration to include modern forms of
communication and to restrict the use of search warrants to obtain information from
reporters where there is no intent to prosecute the reporter. See Amending the
Department of Justice subpoena guidelines REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/attorney-general-guidelines/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
150
See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (testimony of Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att’y
Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice) (testifying that only
nineteen DOJ subpoenas to the press for confidential source information were
approved between 1991 and 2007).
151
See Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the Justice Department’s
Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 232–33
(1999).
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broadly as possible controversial public issues” and the need to
avoid legal process “that might impair the newsgathering
function.”152
So long as a reporter’s testimony was needed for a
successful Espionage Act leak investigation, the guidelines,
combined with a widespread judicial willingness to enforce a
qualified reporter’s privilege, limited the use of the Espionage
Act to pursue media leakers. At minimum, they forced
prosecutors to think twice about initiating prosecutions unless a
sufficiently compelling need could be shown to overcome the
reporter’s interest, and the public’s interest, in news gathering.
2. A Brave New World?
Technology has fundamentally changed the rules of the
game, limiting if not erasing any First Amendment friction in
prosecutorial decisions to pursue media leakers under the
Espionage Act. The increasing ubiquity of electronic surveillance
tools––ranging from GPS devices to cell phone and e-mail
records to security cameras to bar-coded entry and exit badges–
–eases the government’s burden in identifying leakers in the first
place. Recall the statement, cited earlier, of Matthew Miller, a
spokesperson for Attorney General Eric Holder during the
Obama Administration, to the effect that the administration
found leak cases “‘easier to prosecute’ with ‘electronic evidence.’
. . . . ‘Before, you needed to have the leaker admit it, which
doesn’t happen’ . . . ‘or the reporter to testify about it, which
doesn’t happen.’”153 More chilling still is an exchange recounted
by Lucy Dalglish, the former executive director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press. An Obama administration
intelligence official told her that a subpoena that had been issued
to reporter James Risen was “one of the last you’ll see . . . We
don’t need to ask you who you’re talking to. We know.”154
152

The preamble to the guidelines was revised during the Obama Administration by
Attorney General Eric Holder. The revised guidelines continue to note the need “to
strike the proper balance among several vital interests: Protecting national security,
ensuring public safety, promoting effective law enforcement and the fair
administration of justice, and safeguarding the essential role of the free press in
fostering government accountability and an open society.” 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(2)
(2015).
153
Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 1248.
154
Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR5
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Indeed, the Justice Department eventually dropped its pursuit of
Risen’s subpoena, making clear that it was able to glean the
information that it sought without Risen’s testimony.155
The power of the government’s technological tools to
identify leakers is evident in the search warrant affidavit
submitted in connection with the leak investigation that led to
the prosecution of Stephen Kim.156 That affidavit was submitted
to obtain access to the email account of a Fox News reporter,
who the government already understood to be the recipient of
the leak.157 The affidavit reveals the mind-numbing extent of the
government’s ability to monitor personal connections and trace
leaks electronically. Among other things, the affidavit recounts
the Department of Justice’s awareness that:
●
●

●

155

Kim worked at the same Department of State
location as the Fox reporter;158
A “person with Kim’s profile and password”
accessed the classified material three times earlier
in the same day the news report with the
information was published, specifically accessing
the information at 11:27, 11:37 and 11:48 a.m.;159
That same day there were multiple phone calls
between numbers at the Department of State

See Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called To Testify in Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-reporterjames-risen-will-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html. The
Department of Justice abandoned its demand that Risen testify only after obtaining a
damaging Fourth Circuit ruling denying the existence of any reporter’s privilege in
the federal courts. See United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492 (4th Cir. 2013).
So, the Risen case marked the demise of First Amendment friction in two ways: It
illuminated the vastly diminished need for prosecutors to rely on the testimony of
journalists, and it denied the existence of any legal protection for journalists when
prosecutors do seek their testimony.
156
See Ann Marimow, Ex-State Department adviser Stephen J. Kim sentenced to 13 months
in leak case, WASH. POST (April 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ex-state-dept-adviserstephen-j-kim-sentenced-to-13-months-in-leak-case/2014/04/02/f877be54-b9dd11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_story.html.
157
See Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, 10-mj-00291 (D.D.C.
2011), https://fas.org/sgp/jud/kim/warrant.pdf. The decision to seek the reporter’s
email was later lamented by Attorney General Holder as his biggest regret in office.
Geoff Earle, Holder says he regrets subpoena decision on Fox Reporter, N.Y. POST (Oct.
30, 2014), https://nypost.com/2014/10/30/holder-says-he-regrets-subpoenadecision-on-fox-reporter/.
158
See Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, supra note 157 at ¶ 14.
159
Id. ¶ 18.
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associated with Kim and telephone numbers
associated with the reporter;160
At least one of the phone calls to the reporter’s
phone number was placed from Kim’s desk at the
same time a “person using Kim’s profile” was
viewing the later-reported classified information
on the computer at Kim’s desk;161
During the hour after those phone calls, “security
badge access records” indicated that Kim and the
reporter departed the building at nearly the same
time, were absent from the building for nearly
twenty-five minutes, and then returned to the
building at about the same time;162
Within hours after the simultaneous exit and
entries, the article containing the classified
information was published by Fox News on the
Internet, after which another call of about twentytwo seconds was placed from Kim’s desk
telephone to the reporter’s telephone number;163

Given these electronic investigative capabilities, it is hardly
surprising that in none of the seventeen leak prosecutions since
9/11 did the government need to call a reporter to testify. Indeed,
only once—in seeking James Risen’s testimony in the Sterling
prosecution—did the government even issue a subpoena for a
reporter’s testimony, and that subpoena was abandoned before
Risen had to take the stand.164
The net result is that the need to compel a reporter to
testify has largely been removed from the equation when the
government weighs whether to bring an Espionage Act charge
against a leaker. Largely lost as well is the need for the prosecutor
to weigh the public interest in the leaked information to
determine whether a successful case can be made.

160

Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
162
Id. ¶ 21.
163
Id. ¶ 22.
164
See Apuzzo supra note 155.
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A DOCTRINAL HOUSE OF SAND:
MORISON AND ITS LEGACY

Courts have played an active role in the Espionage Act’s
evolution. The Fourth Circuit’s 1988 decision in Morison––to this
day the only federal appellate court opinion assessing the
constitutionality of a media leak prosecution under Section 793–
–has proven particularly instrumental in the Act’s
transformation. As we saw in Part II, Judge Russell’s opinion for
the court, despite two more cautious concurring opinions,
suggested that there is little if any First Amendment value at
stake in cases involving media leaks of classified information.165
This position has smoothed the government’s path in subsequent
cases, and lower courts routinely cite to and largely follow
Morison’s approach.166 Each new prosecution has helped to
normalize the next, not only in a social or cultural sense, but in
a doctrinal sense as well.
Yet Morison’s doctrinal house is built on sand. Judge
Russell’s opinion is steeped in anachronism, relying heavily on
cases involving the prosecution of spies in the mid-twentieth
century, long before the Act was embraced as a vehicle for
prosecuting media leaks.167 More so, the opinion relies partly on
free speech cases from early in the twentieth century, before the
enunciation of today’s far more protective free speech
doctrine.168 It thus is well past time to reevaluate the precarious
doctrinal foundation on which Espionage Act leak prosecutions
are being so vigorously pursued.
A. United States v. Morison
As discussed in Part II, Morison was prosecuted for
leaking classified photographs of a Soviet air carrier to a British
periodical called Jane’s Fighting Ships.169 Writing for the court,
Judge Russell characterized Morison’s leak as conduct––
specifically, as theft––rather than speech.170 As such, the court
did “not perceive any First Amendment rights to be implicated
165

See supra notes 116–127 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.
167
See infra Part III.A.
168
See infra Part III.A.
169
844 F.2d 1057, 1060–63 (4th Cir. 1988).
170
Id. at 1077.
166
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here.”171 Accordingly, the court refused to exempt media leaks
from the statute’s reach.172 The court also rejected Morison’s
vagueness and overbreadth arguments, deeming the Espionage
Act’s sweeping terms compatible with both due process and free
speech.173
In treating media leakers as strangers to the First
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit purported to stand atop a
precedential edifice. Yet, that edifice crumbles upon
examination, revealing a foundation of anachronisms and
questionable leaps of logic. For example, Morison’s most radical
notion––that media leaks are theft, not speech––relies on cases
of questionable continuing validity given decades of subsequent,
more protective free speech case law. Morison’s vagueness and
due process analyses are even more reliant on anachronism and
precedential mismatch. Indeed, Morison’s vagueness and due
process discussions reach back to a 1941 case that long predates
key developments in modern First Amendment doctrine,
involved classic espionage, and applied more rigorous scienter
requirements than those at issue in Morison and subsequent
media leak cases.174
The remainder of Subpart A elaborates on these aspects
of Morison. Subpart B then traces the path taken by recent district
court opinions that rely uncritically on Morison and compound
its errors.
1. Classified Speech as Theft / Conduct
In likening Morison’s leak to an “act of thievery,”175
Judge Russell made a category error that rested partly on a
doctrinal anachronism. Citing Branzburg, the Morison court
explained that “[i]t would be frivolous to assert . . . that the First
Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise,
confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to
violate valid criminal laws.”176 Recall, however, that the issue in
Branzburg was not whether reporters’ or sources’ speech could be

171

Id. at 1069.
Id.
173
Id. at 1074–76.
174
See infra Part III.A.
175
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1069.
176
Id. at 1068.
172
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punished directly.177 The quite different question before the
Supreme Court was whether reporters had a privilege against
generally applicable subpoena procedures when those
procedures might impair their reporting.178 The Morison court
thus conflated a generally applicable procedure that could impact
speech and press freedoms with a law targeting speech itself. In
doing so, it also engaged in circular reasoning; it labeled it a
crime to convey classified information and then explained that
such conveyance cannot be speech because it is a crime.179
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Morison contained a clue
that this category error, and the resulting tautology, were
grounded in doctrinal anachronism. In it, the court repeated the
following line from Branzburg, which itself was a quote from an
earlier case: “[H]owever complete is the right of the press to state
public things and discuss them, that right, as every other right
enjoyed in human society, is subject to the restraints which
separate right from wrong-doing.”180 The line was originally
published well before the modern era of free speech doctrine, in
the 1918 case of Toledo Newspaper Company v. United States.181
Writing for the Branzburg Court, Justice White follows the quote
with a footnote explaining that Toledo:
involved a construction of the Contempt of Court
Act of 1831 . . . which permitted summary trial of
contempts “so near (to the court) as to obstruct the
administration of justice.” The Court held that the
Act required only that the conduct have a “direct
tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of
judicial duty.” This view was overruled and the
177

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
See id.
179
Cf. Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 987 (2016) (explaining that courts “can’t justify treating
speech as ‘integral to illegal conduct’ simply because the speech is illegal under the
law that is being challenged. That should be obvious, since the whole point of
modern First Amendment doctrine is to protect speech against many laws that make
such speech illegal.”).
180
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1069.
181
Compare, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (announcing the
“clear and present” danger test but applying it in a relatively speech-restrictive
manner) with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (articulating the more
speech-protective modern incitement test). Compare, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (characterizing fighting words in potentially
broad terms) with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (defining fighting
words narrowly).
178
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Act given a much narrower reading in [subsequent
precedent.]182
As Justice White’s footnote reflects, the ready equation of
speech that threatens security or government operations with
conduct is anachronistic. Indeed, while Toledo initially was
reversed on statutory construction grounds,183 the Supreme
Court subsequently deemed the First Amendment to limit the
circumstances under which contempt-of-court can be
punished.184 Similarly, the incitement and fighting words
doctrines both evolved over the course of the twentieth century
from tools to punish speech for its remote potential to inspire
violence, to vehicles to protect speech not closely linked to such
violence.185
To support its conclusion that Morison engaged in
unprotected thievery, the Morison court also cited two cases in
which the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, respectively,
upheld contracts wherein former CIA agents agreed to submit
future writings about the agency for pre-publication review.186
The Morison court acknowledged that the cases were not
“directly on point,” but deemed them “relevant.”187 In fact,
employing the pre-publication review cases––which themselves
have been subject to well-earned criticism188––to support
182

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 752 n. 30.
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48–51 (1941).
184
Bloom v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206 (1968) (explaining that the Court has
invoked the First Amendment “to ban punishment for a broad category of arguably
contemptuous out-of-court conduct.”). See also Volokh, supra note 179, at 1019 (citing
mid-20th century cases that “used the First Amendment to set aside convictions for
statutory contempt of court.”).
185
See sources cited supra note 181; see also supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
186
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1069 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing United
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972); Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 508 (1980)).
187
Id. at 1069.
188
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Oona A. Hathaway, The Government’s Prepublication
Review Process is Broken, WASH. POST, (Dec. 25, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-governments-prepublicationreview-process-is-broken/2015/12/25/edd943a8-a349-11e5-b53d972e2751f433_story.html.; Kevin Casey, Till Death Do Us Part: Prepublication Review
in the Intelligence Community, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (2015); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 662 (1981). Last year the Knight Institute and the ACLU filed a lawsuit
alleging that the system of pre-publication review violates the First Amendment right
of authors to convey and of the public to hear, in a timely manner, the opinions of
former government employees on issues of public importance, and also violates the
Fifth Amendment by failing to provide former employees with fair notice of what
they can and cannot publish without prior review and inviting arbitrary and
183
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criminal prosecutions marks a dangerous doctrinal leap. Most
importantly, each court in the pre-publication review cases––the
Supreme Court in 1980’s Snepp v. United States189 and the Fourth
Circuit in 1972’s United States v. Marchetti190––was careful to
hinge its holding on the existence of context-specific
safeguards.191 In Snepp, the Supreme Court emphasized the tight
fit between the civil penalty imposed upon Snepp––a
constructive trust on book profits––and Snepp’s transgression of
bypassing pre-publication review.192 In Marchetti, the Fourth
Circuit stressed that pre-publication review must include
procedural limits, including strict restrictions on review time.193
Furthermore, as one of us has detailed elsewhere, Snepp was rife
with procedural regularities that call into question its own
soundness and certainly caution against applying it to new
factual settings.194
2. Vagueness
Among Morison’s constitutional defenses was the
argument that the statutory phrase, “relating to the national

discriminatory enforcement by censors. See Edgar v. Ratcliffe, No. 8:19-cv-985-GJH
(D. Md.), No. 20-1568 (4th Cir. 2019).
189
444 U.S. 507 (1980).
190
466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
191
See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515–16; see also Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317.
192
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515–16.
193
Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317.
194
Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 1234 (internal
citations omitted):
In his petition for certiorari, Snepp had asked the Court to
consider the constitutionality of the injunctive and damages
remedies upheld by the appellate court. The government
responded with a conditional cross-petition, asking the Court, if it
granted Snepp’s certiorari petition, also to review the appellate
court’s rejection of the constructive trust remedy that the trial
court had approved. The Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion
focused on the constructive trust issue. The Court’s response to
Snepp’s First Amendment objections were shoe-horned into a
single footnote. Because the Court barely addressed the issues
raised by Snepp, the dissent argued that the Court had effectively
denied Snepp’s petition for certiorari and thus lacked jurisdiction
over the case, given the conditional nature of the government’s
cross-petition. More so, the Court decided the case without
benefit of merits briefs or oral argument.
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defense,” was vague.195 The Morison Court rejected this claim,
deeming the matter settled by two earlier Fourth Circuit cases:
1978’s United States v. Dedeyan196 and 1980’s United States v.
Truong Dinh Hung.197 A close look at both cases, however, reveals
that they entail traditional espionage, or spying, rather than
media leaks.198 Moreover, both rely on a 1941 U.S. Supreme
Court case, Gorin v. United States,199 itself a classic espionage
case.200 It is also an anachronism, pre-dating some of the
twentieth century’s most important advances in First
Amendment law and the rise of the modern classification
system. When we unpack the vagueness precedent relied on in
Morison, then, we are left with an empty vessel at the center of it
all.
Responding to Morison’s vagueness challenge, the
Fourth Circuit hearkened back to its statement “in Dedeyan that
the term ‘relating to the national defense’ was not ‘vague in the
constitutional sense.’”201 Dedeyan, in turn, deemed the matter to
have been resolved by the Gorin Court, which “found that the
phrase [national defense] has a ‘well understood connotation’
and is not impermissibly vague.”202 The Morison court also
observed that the respective statutory provisions at issue in
Morison and in Dedeyan share a common scienter requirement, as
each “prescribe[s] that the prohibited activity must be
‘willful.’”203
The Fourth Circuit also pointed to two jury instructions
employed by the district court in Morison’s case, explaining that
they constitute “precisely the instruction on [the] vagueness issue
that we approved in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung.”204 The
instructions included one to the effect that Morison must, given
the statutory “willfulness” requirement, have violated the law
195

United States v. Morison, 604 F.Supp. 655, 658 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that
“there is no requirement of intent to injure the United States and only scienter
required is wilful [sic] transmission or delivery to one not entitled to receive it.”).
196
584 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1978).
197
629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
198
See Dedeyan, 584 F.2d at 38; see also Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 912.
199
312 U.S. 19 (1941).
200
See Dedeyan, 584 F.2d at 39; see also Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 918–19; Gorin,
312 U.S. at 21–23.
201
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988).
202
Dedeyan, 584 F.2d at 39 (citing Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28).
203
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071.
204
Id. at 1072 (citing Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 919).
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knowingly,205 and another to the effect that documents or
photographs “relate to national defense” if they are closely held
and if their disclosure could be “potentially damaging to the
United States or . . . useful to an enemy of the United States.”206
Although the Morison court characterized these instructions as
having fixed a vagueness problem in Truong Dinh Hung, the court
in the latter case had deemed them curative of overbreadth rather
than vagueness.207 In any event, the Truong Dinh Hung court cited
Gorin and Dedeyan to support its conclusion that the instructions
sufficed constitutionally.208
The Morison court thus relied heavily on Dedeyan and
Truong Dinh Hung to conclude that Sections 793(d) and (e),
coupled with appropriate jury instructions, are not vague as
applied to media leakers.209 The Fourth Circuit’s readiness to
liken Morison to Dedeyan and Truong Dinh Hung, however, belies
material differences between the cases. Whereas Morison entailed
a media leak, Dedeyan involved a man who knew but failed to
report that his cousin, a Russian agent, had photographed
classified information in Dedeyan’s possession.210 The
defendants in Truong Dinh Hung had secretly delivered classified
documents to the Vietnamese government “at the time of the
1977 Paris negotiations between that country and the United
States.”211
In the context of such classic spying, it makes some sense
to reason––as did the Dedeyan court––that “injury to the United
States” and bad faith “could be inferred.”212 Such inference is
much harder to justify, however, in the context of a media leak.
The district court in Morison addressed this point briefly, only to
dismiss it.213 The district court reasoned that “the danger to the
205

Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1071–72.
207
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 919 (citing Gorin, 312 U.S. at 27–28; Dedeyan, 584
F.2d at 36).
208
Id.
209
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071–72.
210
Dedeyan, 584 F.2d at 37–39 and 41 n.1. Dedeyan was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §
793(f)(2). That provision makes it a crime for anyone with authorized possession of
documents or writing “relating to the national defense . . . having knowledge that the
same has been illegally removed . . . or . . . abstracted,” to fail to report such removal
or abstraction. See Dedeyan, 584 F.2d at 37 n.1.
211
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 911.
212
See Dedeyan, 584 F.2d at 39.
213
See United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Va. 1985).
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United States is just as great . . . whether the information is
released to the world at large or whether it is released only to
specific spies.”214 This cavalier rejoinder fails to account,
however, for the fact that classic spying, in contrast to media
leaks, aims to keep U.S. officials in the dark, for the
countervailing public interests in media leaks, and for the
divergent inferences that can fairly be drawn about intent in the
respective settings.
Dedeyan and Truong Dinh Hung themselves lean on Gorin
for support. Gorin, too, involved classic spying, with Gorin
having delivered reports on Japanese activity in the United States
to the Soviet Union during World War II.215 Gorin also involved
a more rigorous scienter requirement than that at issue in
Morison, or, for that matter, in Dedeyan or Truong Dinh Hung.
Gorin was convicted of obtaining and delivering documents
“connected with the national defense” to an agent of a foreign
nation,216 in violation of the provision now codified at Section
794(a) of the Espionage Act.217 That provision demanded an
“intent or reason to believe that the information . . . is to be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any
foreign nation.”218 Recall that Sections 793(d) and (e)––as well as
Section 794(f)(2), at issue in Dedeyan––have been deemed by
courts to require that disclosure be “potentially damaging to the
United States or . . . useful to an enemy of the United States.”219
Even assuming that a broader range of information is to the
“advantage of any foreign nation” than is “useful to an enemy”–
–a point that is, in fact, disputable220––the more significant
difference is that between the Gorin provision’s emphasis on
whether a disclosure “is to be used” to injury or advantage, and
Section’s 793’s focus on a disclosure’s “potential” damage or
utility.
214

Id.
Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 21–22 (1941).
216
Id.
217
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 618 (E.D. Va. 2006) (explaining that
Gorin was prosecuted under the provision “currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §
794(a)”).
218
Gorin, 312 U.S. at 27–28 (emphasis added).
219
See United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing the district
court’s limiting instruction to the jury); Morison, 604 F. Supp. at 660.
220
For one thing, as the Gorin Court observes, “the status of a foreign government
may change.” Gorin, 312 U.S. at 30. That status also might be unclear or might shift
with the context. Indeed, the “enemy” clause may well refer to lone wolves or to
groups of people, whether foreign or domestic. Id. at 30. The “any foreign nation”
clause, on the other hand, plainly is limited to foreign nations. Id. at 28–29.
215
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Morison also challenged the “potentially damaging . . . or
useful” instruction itself as vague.221 In response, the Fourth
Circuit relied again on Dedeyan, noting that “we expressly
approved [that instruction] on appeal” there.222 The Fourth
Circuit also observed that Justice White used the phrase
“potentially damaging” in his concurrence in New York Times v.
United States (the Pentagon Papers case).223 Given the fact that
all Espionage Act discussions in The Pentagon Papers
concurrences were dicta, and given the extraordinary
circumstances of the case––including a massively accelerated
briefing and opinion schedule––Justice White’s offhand use of a
phrase in concurrence hardly constitutes meaningful authority to
support the term’s constitutional adequacy.224 Indeed, Justice
White used the phrase in the course of describing criminal
remedies authorized by Congress rather than opining on their
constitutionality.225 He also supported his use of the phrase by
reference to Gorin, which applied a more rigorous scienter
standard than one involving “potential” damage.226
Finally, Gorin is an anachronism, having been decided
long before some of the most important modern First
Amendment precedents were established. Gorin came about at
the very dawn of the classification system, when it was still
confined to the military and was far from the government-wide
behemoth that it is at present. While these factors––particularly
the classification system’s evolution––bear on Gorin’s use in
modern vagueness inquiries, they are more pertinent still in the
First Amendment overbreadth context. As we shall see in the
next section, the Morison court leans on its vagueness analysis––
and hence on Gorin––in the overbreadth setting as well.
3. First Amendment Overbreadth
The Morison court borrowed from its speech-as-conduct
and vagueness analyses to address Morison’s overbreadth
221

United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1072 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id.
223
Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 740 (White, J.,
concurring)).
224
See KITROSSER, supra note 12 at 136 (cautioning against relying on Pentagon
Papers concurrences about the Espionage Act for this reason).
225
See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 740 (White, J., concurring).
226
See id. at 739–40 (White, J., concurring).
222
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challenge. The court explained, first, that overbreadth doctrine
applies less rigorously to statutes that “regulate ‘conduct in the
shadow of the First Amendment.’”227 Given the court’s view that
conveying classified information is akin to thievery, it concluded
that any overbreadth in the relevant Espionage Act provisions
must be “not only . . . real, but substantial as well . . . .”228
Drawing on its vagueness analysis, the court also deemed
any overbreadth in the term “national defense” cured by the
district court’s instructions defining matters relating to the
“national defense” as those that “‘directly or may reasonably be
connected with the defense of the United States,’ the disclosure
of which ‘would be potentially damaging to the United States or
might be useful to an enemy of the United States’ and which had
been ‘closely held’ by the government . . . .”229 In this, the Morison
court effectively relied again on Dedeyan, Truong Dinh Hung, and
Gorin.
Although the Supreme Court framed Gorin as a vagueness
case, courts subsequently have relied on it––both indirectly, as in
Morison, and directly, as we will see in the next Subpart––to
inform both vagueness and overbreadth analyses in media leaks
cases.230 The Gorin Court itself acknowledged the case’s
implications for free speech, characterizing Gorin’s plea for
narrow statutory construction in “the traditional discussion of
matters connected with the national defense which is permitted
in this country.”231 Because Gorin is rooted partly in ideas about
free speech, and given its influence on subsequent free speech
cases, it is important to understand the nature of the First
Amendment world in which Gorin was decided.

227

Morison, 844 F.2d at 1075.
Id.
229
Id. at 1076.
230
Indeed, overbreadth and vagueness analyses are so entwined in some Espionage
Act cases that courts effectively conflate them. In Morison itself, the Fourth Circuit,
though stressing that the doctrines are different and that it addresses each separately,
concludes a section of its vagueness analysis by noting that it “find[s] no basis . . . for
the invalidation of the statutes for either vagueness or overbreadth . . . .” Id. at 1070,
1073. Similarly, as noted above, the Morison court cited overbreadth analysis from
Truong Dinh Hung in relation to its vagueness discussion, while the Truong Dinh Hung
court drew from Gorin’s vagueness analysis in addressing overbreadth. See Truong
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1980).
231
Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 23 (1941).
228
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For one thing, Gorin predated major, highly protective
developments in free speech law that bear directly on Espionage
Act overbreadth claims. Perhaps most importantly, Gorin was
decided several decades before the Supreme Court established
the “content distinction rule,” whereby laws based on speech
content––including subject matter and communicative impact––
are highly suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.232
Similarly, twenty-eight years passed between the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gorin and its 1969 holding in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.233 The latter established the modern definition of
“incitement,” clarifying and substantially curtailing the
circumstances in which persons can be punished for potentially
inspiring violence through their speech.234 Gorin also was decided
more than a decade before the Supreme Court first used the
phrase “chilling effect,” a concept that would deeply inform and
strengthen free speech doctrine.235
Perhaps more importantly, the classification system was
in its infancy in 1941, the year that Gorin was decided.236 Today’s
bloated, government-wide secrecy juggernaut thus was
unknown, and probably unimaginable to the Gorin Court.237 This
change in circumstances is quite significant. Recall that the Gorin
Court deemed the provision at issue sufficiently precise, and
hence not constitutionally vague, because of its strict scienter
requirement.238 Among the requirement’s redeeming features,
said the Court, was that it logically confined prohibited
disclosures to those involving closely held information.239
232

See, e.g., Williams, supra note 21, at 624–25.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
234
See id. at 448–49; KALVEN, supra note 19; STONE, supra note 20; Redish, supra note
20.
235
Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1473, 1488 (2013) (identifying the “first Supreme Court reference to a First
Amendment chilling effect is found in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Wieman
v. Updegraff in 1952.”). See also id. at 1491–95 (describing chilling effect analysis);
Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 879–81 (2005).
236
See supra Part II.
237
The Truman order did not itself lead to an unbroken era of classification system
growth. In response to widespread public and press criticism of the order, President
Eisenhower replaced it with a more modest classification directive in 1953.
Successive orders built on Eisenhower’s approach, until Ronald Reagan imposed
broader classification directives in the 1980s. Harold C. Relyea, Security Classified and
Controlled Information: History, Status, and Emerging Management Issues, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., Feb. 11, 2008, at 3-4.
238
Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1941).
239
Id. at 28 (“Where there is no occasion for secrecy, as with reports relating to
national defense, published by authority of Congress or the military departments,
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Decades later, the Fourth Circuit reiterated this aspect of Gorin
in rejecting vagueness and overbreadth claims in Dedeyan240 and
dismissing an overbreadth claim in Truong Dinh Hung.241 In
Morison, the court drew on these features of Dedeyan and Truong
Dinh Hung to reject vagueness and overbreadth claims regarding
the term “national defense information.”242 The Morison court
also deemed the statutory term “not entitled to receive it” neither
vague nor overbroad because the court defined it by reference to
the classification system.243
Among the threads that run from Gorin through Morison,
then, is the notion that the classification system plays an essential
role in narrowing the reach of certain Espionage Act provisions
and curing them of potential vagueness or overbreadth. Yet even
if we assume that 1941’s modest military classification system
played that part well, the same cannot be said of the bloated
leviathan that is the modern, government-wide secrecy system.
Even if the classification status of information is sufficiently clear
to resolve vagueness problems, the reach of today’s classification
system still raises substantial overbreadth concerns.
B. Subsequent Cases
Nearly two decades passed between the decision in
Morison and the next federal court opinion on the
constitutionality of Espionage Act prosecutions outside of the
classic spying context. Given the massive uptick in such
prosecutions over the past decade, however, several federal
district courts and one military appellate court since have
weighed in on the matter. The first post-Morison decision––a
2006 opinion in United States v. Rosen and Weisman244 from the
there can, of course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent to give an advantage to
a foreign government.”) See also United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.
1945) (quoting the same language from Gorin and elaborating, “when the
information has once been made public, and has thus become available in one way
or another to any foreign government, the ‘advantage’ intended by the section cannot
reside in facilitating its use . . . .”).
240
United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 39–40, 40 n.8 (4th Cir. 1978).
241
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 918-19, 918 n.9. (4th Cir.
1980).
242
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071–76 (4th Cir. 1988).
243
Id. at 1071–72 (concluding that the term “national defense” is not vague in part
because the trial judge instructed that NDI must be closely held); id. at 1076 (term
“national defense” also not overbroad due partly to same trial judge instruction).
244
445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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Eastern District of Virginia––only nominally involved media
leaks.245 Rosen concerned two lobbyists who received classified
information from a government employee, and who, in the
course of their lobbying, conveyed that information to “members
of the media, foreign policy analysts, and officials of a foreign
government.”246 Nonetheless, Rosen is an important precedent
for media leaks, as the Rosen court grappled with the
constitutionality of the Espionage Act outside of the classic
spying context, considering objections grounded in the First
Amendment and in vagueness principles.247 The cases that arose
subsequent to Rosen entailed government employees or
contractors accused of leaking information to the media or, in
one case, to a public archive.248 Each defendant was charged
under Sections 793(d) and/or (e) for illegally conveying and/or
retaining NDI.249
The courts in these post-Rosen cases largely repeat the
precedential leaps and anachronisms of the Morison court, albeit
with some variation. The sections below analyze relevant aspects
of the opinions. Section 1 discusses the courts’ reactions to the
government’s arguments that classified speech amounts to
thievery or that it otherwise deserves little if any First
Amendment protection. Section 2 considers the courts’
approaches to vagueness and overbreadth.
1. Classified Speech as Theft or as Otherwise Unworthy of
First Amendment Protection
The first court to adopt Morison’s reasoning to the effect
that conveying classified information to a reporter merits little if
any First Amendment protection was the District Court for the
245

See id. at 608.
Id.
247
See id. at 607.
248
See sources cited supra notes 135–138 (citing summaries of Section 793 cases
brought under Obama and Trump administrations). See also Josh Gerstein, Ex-Navy
linguist pleads guilty in secret documents case, POLITICO, (Apr. 25, 2014).
https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/04/ex-navy-lingust-pleadsguilty-in-secret-documents-case-187436 (explaining that the removal and retention
“charge to which Hitselberger pled guilty covered only two documents, but [that]
earlier charges in the case accused him of taking other documents and of sending
some classified documents to a public archive at Stanford University’s Hoover
Institution.”).
249
See sources cited supra notes 135–138 (citing summaries of Section 793 cases
brought under Obama and Trump administrations).
246
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District of Columbia in 2011’s United States v. Kim.250 The Kim
court drew the same tautology as had the Morison court, to the
effect that, because Section 793(d) criminalizes such speech, the
speech amounts to criminal conduct and warrants no
constitutional protection.251 To support this reasoning, the Kim
court cited Morison’s characterization of classified speech as “an
act of thievery.”252 Indeed, Kim extended the thievery analogy
even further than had the Morison court. The defendant in
Morison had physically removed original photographs from the
Navy’s possession, sliced off their borders, and sent them to a
publication.253 In contrast, Kim conveyed information orally,
and the district court deemed that speech to constitute theft.254
The Kim court also cited Frohwerk v. United States255 to bolster the
case that there were no First Amendment rights at stake.256
Frohwerk, a 1919 case, was among the earliest “clear and present
danger” cases. It evinced a far less speech protective view of the
First Amendment than did later incitement cases, particularly
the landmark 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio.257 Indeed,
Frohwerk’s anachronistic, speech-restrictive cast is evident in the
parenthetical description of it that the Kim court itself provides:
In Frohwerk, the Supreme Court denied First Amendment
protection for “defendants’ attempts to cause disloyalty and
mutiny in the military through the publication of newspaper
articles.”258
250

United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44 (2011).
Id. at 56 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Cream Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949) for the general proposition that speech is unprotected if it constitutes “an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”). As Professor
Volokh has very ably explained, if the First Amendment bears any weight at all, then
the Giboney language cannot possibly mean that speech falls within the Giboney
exception so long as a statute criminalizes the speech itself. Volokh, supra note 179,
at 1052. He also observed that the Supreme Court itself has rejected the notion that
speech can be turned into criminal conduct through statutory fiat. Id. at 1016–21,
1035.
252
Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057,
1069 (4th Cir. 1988)).
253
Morison, 844 F.2d at 1061.
254
Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
255
249 U.S. 204 (1919).
256
Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
257
See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
258
Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (citing Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205-06). An additional
aspect of Kim also is worth a mention because it too demonstrates how even carefully
limited doctrinal reasoning can be turned into a one-way ratchet toward speech
suppression. The Kim Court cited the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Boehner v.
McDermott to the effect that “‘those who accept positions of trust involving a duty
not to disclose information they lawfully acquire while performing their
responsibilities have no First Amendment right to disclose that information.’” Kim,
251
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In the 2018 case of United States v. Manning,259 the U.S.
Army Court of Criminal Appeals drew even more
wholeheartedly from Morison’s thievery analogy in rejecting
Chelsea Manning’s overbreadth challenge to Section 793(e).
Manning raised the claim as a defense against her conviction for
transmitting classified documents to Wikileaks.260 The military
court noted its agreement with the Morison court’s view that one
in Morison’s or Manning’s position is “‘not entitled to invoke the
First Amendment as a shield to immunize his act of thievery.’”261
It also quoted approvingly from Morison’s longer explanation to
the effect that no First Amendment rights are at stake, including
its citation to Branzburg for the proposition that the First
Amendment does not “confer[] a license on either the reporter or
his news sources to violate valid criminal laws.”262
In contrast to the Kim and Manning courts, the Eastern
District of Virginia did not agree that there were no First
Amendment rights at stake in Rosen.263 The Rosen court stressed
that the behavior at issue there––oral communications of NDI
by lobbyists “seeking to influence United States foreign policy”–
–“is arguably more squarely within the ambit of the First
Amendment than Morison’s conduct.”264 More fundamentally,
it rejected “the government’s proposed categorical rule that
espionage statutes cannot implicate the First Amendment.”265
The Rosen court also invoked Morison’s two concurrences and
808 F. Supp. 2d at 56–57 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 579 (D.C.
Cir. 2007)). Boehner deemed this broad principle to flow from the 1995 Supreme
Court case of United States v. Aguilar. Boehner, 484 F.3d at 579 (stating that “Aguilar
stands for” this principle). Yet Aguilar’s reasoning was far more limited than the
Boehner Court and the Kim Court would go on to suggest. In Aguilar, the Supreme
Court upheld a federal judge’s conviction for revealing a wiretap order to its subject.
Citing Snepp, the Aguilar Court explained that “[a]s to one who voluntarily assumed
a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to
the same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose restrictions on
unwilling members of the public.” 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995). This statement tells us
only that the assumption of duty lowers the level of constitutional protection relative
to what it otherwise would be. It does not mean that First Amendment protections
fail to apply at all. Indeed, the Aguilar Court stressed that the relevant statute targeted
only disclosures of wiretap orders or applications intended to impede the same. The
Court also cited the obvious state interests in preventing this narrow set of
disclosures. 515 U.S. at 605–06.
259
United States v. Manning, 78 M.J. 501 (2018).
260
Id. at 505–10.
261
Id. at 514.
262
Id.
263
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 630–31 (E.D. Va. 2006).
264
Id. at 630–31.
265
Id. at 629–30.
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reasoned that Morison does not itself demand a categorical
approach.266
Although the Rosen court thoughtfully rejected the notion
that conveying classified information is akin to theft, its
reasoning still marked a far cry from the speech protectiveness
that imbues doctrine outside of the classification context.
Ultimately, the court traded an anachronistic, categorical
approach for a slightly-more-modern but still anachronistic
stance of deep deference to the government. The Rosen court cited
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Dennis v. United
States,267 a Cold War era case in which the Supreme Court upheld
defendants’ convictions for conspiring to organize the
Communist Party of the United States.268 Justice Frankfurter had
taken the view that the Court’s role was limited to asking if
Congress had a “reasonable basis” for passing the legislation at
issue.269 The Rosen court adopted Frankfurter’s approach, citing
his concurrence to support the notion that “the question to be
resolved . . . is not whether [Section] 793 is the optimal
resolution” of the tension between national security and free
speech, “but whether Congress, in passing this statute, has struck
a balance between these competing interests that falls within the
range of constitutionally permissible outcomes.”270
The Rosen court also drew a constitutional distinction
between government employees in positions of trust with the
government, like Morison,271 and outsiders like Rosen and
Weisman. With respect to the former, there is “little doubt,” said
the court, that the government constitutionally can prosecute
such persons for disclosing “information relating to the national
defense when that person knew that the information is the type
which could be used to threaten the nation’s security, and that
person acted in bad faith, i.e., with reason to believe the
disclosure could harm the United States or aid a foreign
government.”272 To support this point, it cited Marchetti and
266

Id. at 630.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
268
Id. at 516–17.
269
Id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
270
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (following this reasoning with citation to
Frankfurter concurrence).
271
The distinction was also relevant for Rosen and Weissman insofar as they were
charged not only for their own disclosures but for conspiring with Steven Franklin,
the state department employee from whom they received the information. Id. at 608.
272
Id. at 635.
267
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Snepp, and noted that “the Constitution permits even more
drastic restraints [than criminal penalties] on the free speech
rights of this class of persons.”273
With respect to persons outside the government, like
Rosen and Weissman, the Rosen court deemed New York Times
Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case) “the most relevant
precedent.”274 The court acknowledged that New York Times
involved a prior restraint rather than a criminal prosecution.275 It
observed, however, that “a close reading” of several of the
concurrences and dissents “indicates that” the government might
have prevailed had it “sought to prosecute the newspapers under
[Section] 793(e) subsequent to the publication of the Pentagon
Papers.”276
While the Kim and Manning courts adopted Morison’s
thievery analogy––in Kim, even extending it beyond the physical
removal context and reaching back to Frohwerk for precedential
grounding––the Rosen court replaced the analogy with its own
precedential anachronisms and leaps. Indeed, the Rosen court
journeyed back to the Cold War to dust off and employ Justice
Frankfurter’s free speech minimalism. The court also repeated
the Morison court’s own leap from factually distinct and
procedural extraordinary contexts––particularly those of Snepp
and New York Times––to resolve the weighty First Amendment
question at hand.
2. Vagueness and Overbreadth
With respect to vagueness and overbreadth, Rosen and
subsequent cases largely echo Morison’s analysis, including the
latter’s reliance on classic espionage cases. In Rosen, the Eastern
District of Virginia drew upon Morison, Gorin, Truong Dinh Hung,
and Dedeyan to conclude that “national defense” is a capacious
concept, but that the scope of NDI is sufficiently limited by the
requirements that it be closely held and that its release could be
“potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy

273

Id.
Id. at 637–38.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 638.
274
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of the United States.”277 The Rosen court also cited the statute’s
willfulness requirement, noting that the Fourth Circuit relied on
it in Morison and in Truong.278 Rosen further cited a heightened
statutory scienter requirement applicable only to oral
communications.279 Relying on Gorin’s discussion of a yet more
stringent scienter requirement, the Rosen court deemed the
heightened scienter requirement before it to alleviate any
additional vagueness or overbreadth concerns that might
otherwise be raised by prosecutions for non-tangible leaks.280
The District of Maryland drew upon the same group of
precedents in 2011’s United States v. Drake,281 which involved
Thomas Drake’s prosecution under Section 793(e) for retaining
classified documents.282 The Drake court deemed the defendant’s
vagueness and overbreadth claims foreclosed by Morison.283
Drilling down further, the court cited Truong Dinh Hung to
277
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For intangible leaks, the Espionage Act requires the government to meet an
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‘reason to believe it could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation.’” Id. at 625–26. The Rosen Court likened this
requirement to the predecessor provision at issue in Gorin, which had demanded that
defendants have acted with “intent or reason to believe that the information to be
obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any
foreign nation.” Id. at 626. The Court dismissed the significance of the distinction
between the earlier statute’s language – “is to be used” – and the current language––
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requirement, id. at 626–27, 627 n.35. See also United States v. Rosen, 520 F.Supp.2d
786, 793 (E.D.Va. 2007) (reiterating view that statutory language requires a “bad
faith purpose”).
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interlocutory appeal in Rosen, the Fourth Circuit, in dicta, called into question the
lower court’s view that the statute requires bad faith. United States v. Rosen &
Weissman, 557 F.3d 192, 199 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that it lacks jurisdiction to
review the question, but that “[w]e are nevertheless concerned by the potential that
the § 793 Order imposes an additional burden on the prosecution not mandated by
the governing statute.”) Citing the Fourth Circuit’s comments as well as the fact that
Rosen involved persons not in positions of trust with the government, the district
court for the Eastern District of Virginia declined to impose a bad faith requirement
in United States v. Kiriakou, which also involved oral disclosures. United States v.
Kiriakou, 898 F.Supp.2d 921, 925 (E.D. Va. 2012).
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818 F.Supp.2d 909 (D. Md. 2011).
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Id. at 911–12.
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support its conclusion that the statute’s willfulness requirement
is sufficiently clear.284 It relied on Truong Dinh Hung again, as well
as Gorin and Dedeyan, in concluding that the term “national
defense” was amply delimited.285
Courts have struck similar notes in other recent media
leaks cases. In 2013, the District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected a vagueness challenge to Section 793(e) in
United States v. Hitselberger.286 The case involved Hitselberger’s
prosecution for retaining and removing classified documents.287
Citing Morison, Drake, and Rosen, among other precedents,288 the
court explained that “courts have uniformly held that the judicial
gloss on [the challenged] clauses provides sufficient notice of
what conduct is criminalized.”289 The other recent media leaks
opinions, including Manning, Kiriakou, and Kim, draw on these
precedents in similar ways.290
Courts in recent media leaks cases have doubled down, in
short, on Morison’s vagueness and overbreadth analyses,
including Morison’s reliance on key precedents including Gorin,
Truong Dinh Hung, and Dedeyan. As we saw earlier, Morison’s
uses of these precedents were flawed; the Fourth Circuit
stretched some precedents beyond reasonable contextual bounds
and used others anachronistically. Insofar as subsequent cases
repeat Morison’s applications of these precedents, they exacerbate
these mistakes and the consequent damage to First Amendment
values.
IV. ALIGNING THE ESPIONAGE ACT WITH
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As demonstrated above, Espionage Act prosecutions
based upon leaking classified information to the press present
specific and substantial First Amendment issues that have yet to
be addressed by any appellate court. This First Amendment
284
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See United States v. Manning, 78 M.J. 501, 512–14 (Army Crim. App. 2018);
United States v. Kiriakou, 898 F.Supp.2d 921, 923–26 (E.D. Va. 2012); United
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conflict is unavoidable given the broad reach and undefined
terminology of the Espionage Act.
On its face, the Act criminalizes speech and requires the
government only to prove that the defendant willfully disclosed
material “relating to the national defense” to one “not entitled to
receive it.”291 For oral communications, the government also
must prove that the defendant had “reason to believe” that the
information “could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation.”292 Notably, the text of
Section 793 nowhere requires the government to prove a specific
intent to harm the national security of the United States, to
demonstrate that a disclosure, in fact, caused such harm, or to
consider countervailing public interests—the only obligation is
to show that the disclosure itself was willful and, for oral
communications alone, that the potential for harm or advantage
was reasonably foreseeable.293 Judicial narrowing constructions
have centered mostly on the terms “relating to the national
defense” and “not entitled to receive it”––incorporating
classification into the latter term, and incorporating both
classification and the criterion that the disclosure could be
“potentially damaging to the United States or . . . useful to an
enemy of the United States” into the former.294
Although the judiciary has been far from heroic in
recognizing or addressing the First Amendment issues raised by
media leak prosecutions, a determined optimist can spot a few
breadcrumbs in the case law that might lead toward a better path.
Recall, for example, that both the concurring judges in Morison
and the District Court in Rosen acknowledged the serious First
Amendment considerations at stake.295 Indeed, the Rosen court
went so far as to impose a heightened scienter requirement, albeit
solely with respect to prosecutions brought for oral
communications, and in the context of a case about third party
291
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speakers rather than government employees or contractors.296
The strength of Rosen’s scienter requirement is somewhat
unclear,297 and courts in subsequent cases have refused, in any
event, to impose it.298 While this aspect of Rosen was never
directly reviewed on appeal,299 the Fourth Circuit called it into
question in dicta on an unrelated interlocutory appeal in the
case.300 Nonetheless, the Rosen court was correct to recognize the
First Amendment conflict inherent in the attempt to protect
national security by imposing criminal penalties for the
disclosure of information of significant public concern, with no
obligation to show that the disclosure was made with an intent
to cause harm or that any harm actually occurred.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,301 D.C. Circuit
Judge Tatel faced a similar conflict between competing
interests—the conflict between the common law’s protection of
the confidentiality of a reporter’s sources in order to promote the
flow of information to the public, and the need of grand juries to
obtain evidence in their law enforcement investigations.302 Judge
Tatel concluded that the scope afforded to the reporter’s privilege
must “account for the varying interests at stake in different
source relationships,” and therefore applied a balancing test that
asked whether the reporter’s source “released information more
harmful than newsworthy.”303 If so, he explained, “the public
interest in punishing the wrongdoers––and deterring for future
296
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leaks––outweighs any burden on newsgathering and no privilege
covers the communication.”304
So too, the scope of the First Amendment protection
afforded to speech implicating the national security must
“account for the varying interests at stake.” To secure the First
Amendment’s protection of truthful speech on matters of public
concern in the national security context, Espionage Act liability
based upon a leak to the press must be limited to those cases
where the government’s legitimate interest in suppressing
information whose disclosure would threaten national security
outweighs the public’s legitimate interest in knowing what its
government is up to. The dilemma is finding a way to strike this
balance with clear standards and proper incentives.
Following Rosen, and in response to the transformation of
the Espionage Act into the government’s primary weapon
against leaks of classified information, some commentators have
explored potential fixes to remedy the First Amendment
encroachments. We review a few key proposals below. Each
seeks to resolve the tension between protecting state secrets and
ensuring democratic oversight by drawing upon First
Amendment remedies adopted in other contexts.
Judicial balancing of the competing interests.
Requiring judicial balancing of the competing interests at the
liability stage was explored in a series of papers published by one
of us, Heidi Kitrosser.305 This approach seeks to develop
standards that could be used by courts to define and limit the
subsets of classified information whose disclosure the
government can constitutionally prosecute. It begins with the
recognition that leakers are government employees subject to
control by the executive branch but also are uniquely situated to
bring to light government abuses and mistakes. As such, a
judicial balancing of interests must be calibrated to account for
the employee’s “institutional role,” while not chilling
information that the public needs to know. This led Kitrosser to
propose liability standards that vary depending on the severity of
the punishment the government is seeking:
304
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For prosecutions or civil actions seeking
substantial sanctions, such as several years in
prison or very large monetary penalties, courts
might require the government to show that the
leaker lacked an objectively reasonable basis to
believe that the public interest in disclosure
outweighed identifiable national security harms.
For actions seeking less severe sanctions, courts
might require the government to demonstrate that
the leaker lacked an objectively substantial basis to
believe that the public interest in disclosure
outweighed identifiable national security harms.306
As Kitrosser acknowledged, “there is nothing magical about any
given standard or approach.”307 What is essential is that courts
recognize the First Amendment interests at stake and find a way
to assess the harms and benefits of particular leaks, rather than
deferring to sweeping legislative rules and largely unconstrained
acts of executive discretion. The precise formulas developed
toward this end are less crucial than is that fundamental shift in
approach.
Affording a First Amendment defense. Writing in
2014, Yochai Benkler proposed giving those prosecuted for
media leaks an affirmative “accountability” defense rather than
placing additional burdens on the government.308 His public
accountability defense would be generally available to
individuals who violate a law in order to “expose to public
scrutiny” substantial illegality, or substantial incompetence or
malfeasance that “falls short of formal illegality.”309 As Benkler
conceives of the defense, it could be asserted both by leakers and
journalists, and it would provide a defense against any charge
brought arising out of the dissemination of classified
information.310

306

Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 1264; see also
Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State, supra note 4, at 441.
307
Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 1264.
308
Benkler, supra note 4, at 283–84, 303–04; see also Takefman, supra note 4, at 924-25
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Under Benkler’s proposal, defendants would have an
affirmative defense to criminal liability where (1) they held a
reasonable belief that the information disclosed revealed “a
substantial violation of law or substantial systemic error,
incompetence, or malfeasance[;]” (2) available steps were taken
“to avoid causing imminent, articulable, substantial harm that
outweighs the benefit of disclosure[;]” and (3) the information
was disclosed in a manner “likely to result in actual exposure to
the public.”311 Additional factors that could be relevant to his
public accountability defense include whether the defendant
plausibly believed the disclosed information was not properly
classified, whether other means existed to expose the
government wrongdoing, and the extent to which the disclosure
generates public debate or other public response.312
Benkler’s approach follows the logic of Judge Tatel and
urges that the significance of the government wrongdoing
disclosed is the most important factor to consider; that factor can
even be outcome determinative without substantial efforts by a
defendant to mitigate the harm caused by disclosure.313 Benkler
reasons that such a defense would retain most of the deterrent
effects of criminalizing leaks by placing on the defendant the risk
that the defense will be found not to apply, while also changing
the prosecutorial calculus in deciding whether to pursue cases
involving leaks that informed the public of substantial abuses of
government power.314
First Amendment mitigation. In 2018, we urged a
judicial weighing of the public interest in the disclosed
information at sentencing in the prosecution of Terry Albury,
who had pleaded guilty to revealing information concerning law
enforcement’s targeting of Somali residents in Minnesota.315 As
we urged there, courts may consider whether circumstances
warrant a departure from the sentencing range that would be
appropriate for an offense within a criminal statute’s
“heartland;” more broadly, courts may evaluate whether
Sentencing Guidelines punishment is “just” under the
311
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circumstances.316 Prosecutions of leakers to the media target
conduct well-outside the “heartland” of the Espionage Act.317
Achieving what is “just” in such cases requires some assessment
of the public importance of the information disclosed.
Courts are thus empowered to craft sentences in
Espionage Act leaks cases that reflect the grave First
Amendment concerns raised when individuals are prosecuted for
speaking to the press on matters of serious public importance.
Weighing the public interest in the disclosed information would
also address the Supreme Court’s concern that “[t]he severity of
criminal sanctions” themselves may “cause speakers to remain
silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful”
speech.318 Under a sentence mitigation approach, courts could
consider at the sentencing of a leaker such factors as:
(1) the strength of the decision to classify the
information in question and any actual sensitivity
of that information the government may present;
(2) how and to whom the information was
disclosed – i.e. selectively to the responsible press
[or] indiscriminately to the public; (3) whether . . .
reasonable arguments could be made that the
information disclosed reveals illegal government
activity; (4) whether alternative means of
disclosure were available, were exhausted, or
would have been effective; and (5) the extent to
which the disclosure in fact prompted public
deliberation, debate, or action.319
Weighing the public interest as a factor in sentence
mitigation was also recently advocated by Marilyn Fidler, who
argued that sentencing is the most appropriate place to consider
public accountability factors in whistleblower cases.320 As she
observes, courts have long taken constitutional interests into
316
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account at sentencing, as they did with rescuers who violated the
Fugitive Slave Act and with absolutist conscientious objectors
during the Vietnam War.321 Fidler argues that a similar judicial
accounting of the public interest at sentencing in an Espionage
Act leak prosecution is particularly appropriate because
Congress never conceived of that Act as an official secrets act.322
Congress thus did not itself weigh the relevant interests in
fashioning the law’s scope. Nor has the executive branch shown
much appetite for exercising discretion and declining to
prosecute Espionage Act cases involving leaks of great public
importance.323
Each of these approaches seeks to resolve the inherent
conflict between protecting state secrets and ensuring democratic
oversight by drawing upon First Amendment remedies adopted
in other contexts. The fixes identify several factors relevant to an
accounting of the competing interests at stake: Was the disclosed
information properly classified because its disclosure was likely
to harm national security? Was the information widely known
before the disclosure? How and to whom was the information
disclosed? Was there a reasonable basis to believe the leaked
information disclosed illegal or improper government action?
What was the public response to the disclosure? The proposed
approaches differ as to when and how these considerations
should be raised in an Espionage Act prosecution, and by whom,
but each embraces the essential point that Espionage Act
prosecutions of media leakers raise unavoidable First
Amendment concerns.
We view these proposals as complementary instruments
that collectively can safeguard both the government’s legitimate
secrets and the flow of national security information essential for
public oversight and democratic accountability. Indeed, the First
Amendment interests should be considered at each stage of an
Espionage Act prosecution, whether the defendant is the leaker
or the recipient of a leak. The proposals above, or something
much like them, could accomplish that goal. They could do so
by: (1) imposing a First Amendment burden on the government
in any leak case to demonstrate that the leaker had a bad faith
321
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motive as required in Rosen, or at a minimum lacked an
objectively reasonable basis to believe the public interest in
disclosure would outweigh any likely harm; (2) providing a First
Amendment defense that bars liability if the factfinder
determines that the public importance of the leak outweighs the
actual, articulable harm to national security; and (3) mitigating
sentences imposed in cases where the publicly disclosed
information is of substantial public interest. Collectively, such
measures would enable the judicial system to strike an
appropriate balance between the government’s legitimate need
for secrecy and the public’s legitimate need for information, on a
case-by-case basis with workable standards.
CONCLUSION
There is considerable room to debate optimal solutions to
the deep constitutional conundrums posed by media leak
prosecutions. One point, however, is plain: No legislative or
judicial fixes will be forthcoming until policymakers and courts
acknowledge that serious First Amendment problems exist in the
first place. To get to this point, it is not enough to invoke core
principles of free speech theory, basic rules of free speech
doctrine, or the bloated and unreliable nature of the classification
system. These factors comprise a compelling case, to be sure. But
the case is not complete until we confront a growing body of
judicial opinions that fly in the face of those core theoretical,
doctrinal, and experiential insights.
We must, in short, reassess the growing doctrinal edifice
to which courts and prosecutors increasingly point to suggest
that media leak prosecutions raise no serious First Amendment
concerns. Despite the weight that it has gained through sheer
repetition, the edifice is a house of sand. It is built on longunexamined anachronisms, logical leaps, and inapposite
precedents. And it increasingly enables a state of affairs that the
concurring judges in Morison warned against, one in which
“those who truly expose governmental waste and misconduct”324
can be prosecuted for so doing.
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Without the edifice of Morison and its progeny to obscure
our view, we can look anew at the Espionage Act, its application
to media leaks, and the compatibility of both with the First
Amendment. From this vantage point, it is much easier to grasp
the truly radical nature of an approach that permits the use of the
Espionage Act as something akin to an official secrets act. With
our perspectives so refreshed, we can begin the work of building
new legislative, judicial, and executive frameworks to protect
necessary national security secrets while safeguarding free
speech and democratic accountability.

